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PREFACE 
In response to the request of His Excellency, Theodore 
Francis Green, Governor of the State of Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations, the advisory opinion of the Supreme 
Court was rendered April 1, 1935, upon questions relating 
to a constitutional convention. 
The opinion of the Supreme Court together with the affirm-
ative and negative briefs, prepared by distinguished members 
of the Rhode Island Bar, submitted to the Supreme Court 
upon these questions, are herein reprinted in documentary 
form for fu ture reference in response to the widespread de-
mand and because they are important historical contribu-
tions to the annals of this state, deservedly meriting preser-
vation. 
Secretary of State. 
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ADVISORY OPINION 
OF T H E 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
U P O N QUESTIONS RELATING TO A 
Constitutional Convention 
APRIL 1, 1935 
To His Excellency, Theodore Francis Green, Governor of 
the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations: 
We have received from Your Excellency a request for our 
written opinion upon a question of law in accordance with 
the following section of article X I I of amendments to the 
constitution of this s tate: "Sec. 2. The judges of the supreme 
court shall give their written opinion upon any question of 
law whenever requested by the governor or by either house 
of the general assembly": The question is as follows: 
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power if 
the General Assembly should provide by law, 
(a) for a convention to be called to revise or amend the 
constitution of the s tate; 
(b) that the governor shall call for the election, at a 
date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such conven-
tion in such number and manner as the General 
Assembly shall determine; 
(c) that the general officers of the state shall by virtue 
of their offices be members of such convention; 
(d) for the organization and conduct of such conven-
tion; 
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(e) for the submission to the people, for their ratifica-
tion and adoption, of any constitution or amend-
ments proposed by such convention; and 
(f) for declaring the result and effect of the vote of a 
majority of the electors voting upon the question of 
such ratification and adoption?" 
If this language were strictly and literally construed, it 
would require us to give a negative answer to the question, 
unless we should be of the opinion that it would be a valid 
exercise of its legislative power for the general assembly to 
pass an act or resolution which would contain provisions for 
all the different matters which are set forth in sub-para-
graphs (a) to (f) , inclusive, of the question. For obvious 
reasons we do not believe that the question was intended to 
be so construed. 
Therefore, to carry out what we believe to be the real in-
tent and purpose of the question, we construe it as compris-
ing six questions, the first of which is whether it would be a 
valid exercise of the power of the general assembly, if it 
should provide, by an act or resolution, for the calling of a 
convention to revise or amend the constitution of the state. 
All of the other questions are only subsidiary and have no 
meaning, unless this first and primary question is answered 
in the affirmative. Assuming that it is so answered, each of 
the other questions is whether such an act or resolution of 
the general assembly could legally contain such a provision 
as is set forth in (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f) as the case may 
be. 
These questions raise an issue that has long troubled the 
people of our state. That issue simply put is whether Arti-
cle XI I I of our constitution prescribes an exclusive method 
of altering the constitution either in part or as a whole. If 
it does, then a legal constitutional convention is an impossi-
bility in Rhode Island. The judges of this court in an opinion 
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submitted to the Honorable Senate forty-two years ago, In 
Re The Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649, (March 30, 
1883), said that it did. Since that time there has been no 
fur ther judicial expression on the point in this state. Almost 
from the day it was given, however, that opinion has been 
subjected to vigorous attack by authorities on the law of con-
stitutional conventions both within and without the state. No 
court anywhere in the country when called upon to consider 
a similar constitutional question has cited it for authority. 
In view of the foregoing, we have deemed it of the utmost 
importance in our consideration of the questions before us 
to exhaust every avenue of information that would assist us 
in giving our opinion. Accordingly we have largely laid aside 
other duties pressing upon us and have devoted ourselves to 
a thorough, painstaking examination of the authorities and 
a careful review of the legislative precedents and practice of 
Rhode Island in the field of constitution-making. In this 
we have been ably assisted by outstanding leaders of our bar, 
including the attorney general of the state, who at our invi-
tation appeared before us and argued these intricate consti-
tutional questions. In addition we have had also the benefit 
of their well-prepared and exhaustive briefs in the matter. 
We have carefully considered all the arguments presented 
and have examined and carefully considered all of the au-
thorities to which our attention has been called and many 
others. 
The first and primary question to be considered, then, is 
whether i t would be a valid exercise of the power of the gen-
eral assembly, if it should provide by law for the calling of a 
constitutional convention to revise or amend the constitution 
of the state. In dealing with this question, consideration 
should be given first to the pertinent parts of our constitu-
tion. 
10 
ARTICLE I . 
Declaration of Certain Constitutional Rights and Principles. 
In order effectually to secure the religious and political 
freedom established by our venerated ancestors, and to pre-
serve the same for our posterity, we do declare that the essen-
tial and unquestionable rights and principles hereafter men-
tioned shall be established, maintained, and preserved, and 
shall be of paramount obligation in all legislative, judicial, 
and executive proceedings. 
Section 1. In the words of the Father of his Country, we 
declare that "the basis of our political systems is the right 
of the people to make and alter their constitutions of govern-
ment ; but that the constitution which at any time exists, till 
changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, 
is sacredly obligatory upon all." 
ARTICLE I V . 
Of the Legislative Power. 
Section 1. This constitution shall be the supreme law of 
the state, and any law inconsistent therewith shall be void. 
The general assembly shall pass all laws necessary to carry 
this constitution into effect. 
Sec. 10. The general assembly shall continue to exercise 
the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited 
in this constitution. 
ARTICLE X I I I . 
Of Amendments. 
The general assembly may propose amendments to this 
constitution by the votes of a majority of all the members 
elected to each house. Such propositions for amendment shall 
be published in the newspapers, and printed copies of them 
shall be sent by the secretary of state, with the names of all 
the members who shall have voted thereon, with the yeas and 
nays, to all the town and city clerks in the state. The said 
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propositions shall be, by said clerks, inserted in the warrants 
or notices by them issued, for warning the next annual town 
and ward meetings in April ; and the clerks shall read said 
propositions to the electors when thus assembled, with the 
names of all the representatives and senators who shall have 
voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, before the election of 
senators and representatives shall be had. If a majority of 
all the members elected to each house, at said annual meet-
ing, shall approve any proposition thus made, the same shall 
be published and submitted to the electors in the mode pro-
vided in the act of approval; and if then approved by three-
fifths of the electors of the state present and voting thereon 
in town and ward meetings, it shall become a par t of the con-
stitution of the state. 
The constitution contains no mention of a constitutional 
convention or of any method of constitutional change except 
as above set forth. The title given in the constitution to Ar-
ticle I, namely, "Declaration of Certain Constitutional 
Rights and Principles", shows that the right which is set 
forth in the first section is a constitutional and not a revolu-
tionary right. I t states in substance and effect that one of 
the fundamental rights, which, as the preamble of this article 
says, "shall be established, maintained, and preserved, and 
shall be of paramount obligation in all legislative, judicial, 
and executive proceedings", is the right of the people "to 
make and alter their constitutions of government" by any 
"explicit and authentic act of the whole people." I t is a rec-
ognized principle of free institutions that the normal and 
regular way for the people to act on any matter submitted 
to them, unless some other way is clearly and validly pre-
scribed, is by the votes of a majority of the duly qualified 
electors who vote on such matters, such votes then constitut-
ing an "act of the whole people." 
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According to the language of the section in question such 
an act, to have the effect of making or altering a constitu-
tion must be "an explicit and authentic act", that is, it must 
be clearly and definitely expressed by votes which are cast 
and counted and the result of which is determined, all ac-
cording to law. The second sentence of section 1 of Article 
IV, above quoted is "The general assembly shall pass all laws 
necessary to carry this constitution into effect." Taken alone 
this might reasonably mean that the general assembly shall 
pass all laws necessary to put the constitution into operation 
and to provide for the transition from government under the 
charter to government under the constitution. But these 
matters are well provided for by the constitution itself in 
section 1 of Article XIV, which provides when the constitu-
tion shall go into operation, if adopted, and how the first 
elections under it shall be held and for the transition from 
the old government to the new. 
If the sentence in question were intended to apply only to 
the transition period, it would naturally be placed in Ar-
ticle XIV, which deals with that subject. Instead of being 
so placed, it follows immediately after the sentence "This 
constitution shall be the supreme law of the state, and any 
law inconsistent therewith shall be void." This evidently 
applies to the whole period during which the constitution 
shall be in operation and says that the general assembly can-
not validly pass any laws which are inconsistent with the 
constitution. The most natural conclusion is that the sentence 
which follows, namely, "The general assembly shall pass all 
laws necessary to carry this constitution into effect" was in-
tended to cover the same period and to make it the duty of 
the general assembly, not only to refrain from passing anv 
law which is contrary to the constitution, as provided in the 
first sentence, but also to pass all laws which shall be neces-
sary from time to time to make effective at all times the 
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provisions of the constitution, including those in Article I, 
the "Bill of Rights." For these reasons it is our opinion after 
careful consideration that it is the duty of the general as-
sembly to pass whatever laws may be needed, at any time or 
from time to time, to enable the people by an explicit and au-
thentic act to make a new constitution or to alter the pres-
ent one. 
The method of doing this, which had been recognized as 
the regular and ordinary method and which had been used 
before 1843 by many states, when there was no provision for 
it in their constitutions, was first, by the holding of a con-
vention under a legislative enactment, second, by the fram-
ing of a new constitution or the revision of the existing one 
and third, by the adoption of such new constitution or revi-
sion by the people at an election provided for by law. I t is 
also well settled that no other method can be legally em-
ployed for amending or revising a constitution or substitut-
ing another one for it, unless such other method is expressly 
provided for in the constitution itself. 
The above procedure has also been followed a great many 
times since 1842 in most of our states, without any provi-
sions for it in the constitutions which were in effect in those 
states when the conventions were called. Changes thus made 
have always been recognized as regular and legal and not 
revolutionary by all the text writers on the subject of consti-
tutional law and by all the courts which have dealt with such 
changes, leaving out of consideration for the present two ad-
visory opinions, Opinion of the Justices, 6 Cush. 573, and 
In Re The Constitutional Convention, supra, which will be 
fully discussed later in this opinion. 
The regularity and legality of this method, in the absence 
of any provision for it in a constitution, has perhaps never 
been better stated than by Daniel Webster in his argument 
before the supreme court of the United States in the Rhode 
Island case of Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. 1, (1848). 
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The following quotations from this argument are found in 
"Works of Daniel Webster", VI, 227-229. After speaking of 
the established American doctrine of popular sovereignty he 
said: "Another American principle growing out of this, and 
just as important and well settled as is the t ruth tha t the 
people are the source of power, is that, when in the course 
of events it becomes necessary to ascertain the will of the 
people on a new exigency, or a new state of things or of 
opinion, the legislative power provides for that ascertain-
ment by an ordinary act of legislation. * * * I t is enough 
to say that, of the old thirteen states, the constitutions, with 
but one exception, contained no provision for their own 
amendment. * * * Yet there is hardly one that has not 
altered its Constitution, and it has been done by conventions 
called by the legislature, as an ordinary exercise of legisla-
tive power. 
"One of the most recent laws for taking the will of the 
people in any State is the law of 1845, of the State of New 
York. It begins by recommending to the people to assemble 
in their several election districts, and proceed to vote for del-
egates to a convention. If you will take the pains to read 
that act, it will be seen that New York regarded i t as an or-
dinary exercise of legislative power. * * * We see, there-
fore, from the commencement of the government under which 
we live, down to this late Act of the State of New York, one 
uniform current of law, of precedent, and of practice, all go-
ing to establish the point that changes in government are to 
be brought about by the will of the people, assembled under 
such legislative provisions as may be necessary to ascertain 
that will, truly and authentically." 
The 1821 constitution of New York, in effect when this act 
was passed, contained no provision for calling a constitu-
tional convention and no declaration of popular rights on 
the subject and did contain a provision (Art. 8) for its 
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amendment by legislative proposal, in substantially the same 
way as provided in the constitution of Rhode Island. 
Before 1842 there had been for more than twenty years 
great agitation and discussion of the matter of the framing 
and adopting of a constitution, and the general assembly had 
responded by calling conventions for the purpose in 1824, 
1834, 1841 and 1842, the last one of which framed our pres-
ent constitution adopted in 1842. When the convention placed 
in that constitution the statement that the people of Rhode 
Island had an unquestionable right to make and alter their 
constitution, it had in mind the manner in which this first 
constitution was made and it intended to reserve that right 
to the people for all time. This was the construction placed 
upon this language by the general assembly eleven years later 
in 1853, when they invited the people to elect delegates to a 
convention. There was no question raised at that time of the 
right of the people to do so upon such invitation. All these 
events must be considered in construing the provisions of 
the present constitution which are pertinent to the question 
now under discussion. 
The next of these provisions now to be discussed is the 
above quoted section 10 of Article IV, "The general assembly 
shall continue to exercise the powers they have heretofore 
exercised, unless prohibited in this constitution." I t is our 
opinion, in view of these legislative precedents up to and 
including 1842, that under this language the general assem-
bly, unless prohibited elsewhere in the constitution, has the 
constitutional power to pass a law providing for the calling 
and holding of a convention to revise the existing constitu-
tion or to f rame a new one. 
Can we say that this otherwise clear and undoubted power 
in our general assembly, which it had so frequently exer-
cised under the charter, is non-existent because the exercise 
of it is elsewhere prohibited in the constitution? The word 
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"prohibited" is a strong word and in our judgment is not 
satisfied by anything short of a prohibition that is clearly, 
definitely and necessarily implied, even if it does not require 
that the prohibition be express. Moreover, these facts, above 
stated, should be kept in mind, that section 1 of Article I of 
the constitution states the fundamental right of the people 
"to make and alter their constitutions of government", with 
the sole limitation that this must be done "by an explicit and 
authentic act of the whole people"; that the normal, regular, 
and legal method of exercising that right, unless excluded by 
the constitution, has always been held, in all states and by 
all authorities, to be by the action of a convention chosen 
by the electors and the approval of that action by the votes 
of a majority of the electors who vote thereon, all under a 
law or laws passed by the legislature; that the right of the 
people "to make and alter their constitutions of government 
* * # by an explicit and authentic act" is one of the rights 
which by the preamble to Article I "shall be established, 
maintained, and preserved, and shall be of paramount obliga-
tion in all legislative, judicial, and executive proceedings"; 
and that by section 2 of Article IV it is the duty of the gen-
eral assembly to pass all laws necessary to make this right 
effective. 
These facts strongly support our conclusion that the exer-
cise by our general assembly of its previously exercised right 
to provide by law for calling a constitutional convention can-
not properly be held to be prohibited by anything short of 
a prohibition that is clearly, definitely and necessarily im-
plied, so as to be substantially equivalent to an express pro-
hibition. 
There is in our constitution no express prohibition of the 
exercise by the general assembly of a power to provide for 
a constitutional convention, and the only par t of i t which 
has ever been relied upon as impliedly prohibiting the exer-
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cise of such a power is Article XI I I , above quoted, which 
provides that the general assembly may propose amendments 
to this constitution by following a certain required procedure 
and that such proposals, thus made, may be ratified by three-
fifths of the electors voting thereon. One power which a 
legislature has cannot properly be held to be impliedly pro-
hibited by the grant to it of another power, unless the two 
powers are inconsistent with each other. There is no incon-
sistency whatever between the power of a legislature to pro-
vide for calling a convention, to be chosen by the people, for 
revising a constitution or draf t ing a new one, and to provide 
that a revision or new constitution so made shall be submit-
ted to the people and become operative, if adopted by a ma-
jority vote, and another power in the legislature, by follow-
ing a prescribed procedure, to propose directly to the people 
an amendment or amendments of the existing constitution. 
The two powers are suitable for different purposes, the 
former to a general revision of a constitution or the making 
of a new one, the lat ter to the making of a special and par-
ticular amendment or a few of them, where the matter is 
relatively simple. That they are not inconsistent is shown 
by the fact that very frequently both powers have been pro-
vided for in the same constitution. With both powers the 
main sanction is the vote of the people, but with the former 
the matter voted on by the people is framed by a convention, 
the members of which are specially chosen by the people for 
tha t purpose only and assigned to that one task, and the 
only function of the general assembly is to provide for this 
to be done; with the lat ter the matter voted on by the people 
is framed by the general assembly whose chief function is to 
perform general legislative duties. For these reasons we 
are convinced that the exercise of the former power by the 
general assembly is not prohibited by Article X I I I , which 
merely permits and regulates the exercise of the lat ter power. 
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Yet the judges of this court in 1883 in their opinion en-
titled In Re The Constitutional Convention, supra, advised 
the senate that the exercise of any power by the general as-
sembly to make any provision by law with regard to a consti-
tutional convention was impliedly prohibited by Article 
XIII , which in their judgment was an exclusive provision for 
amending the constitution; that "the mode provided in the 
constitution for the amendment thereof is the only mode in 
which it can be constitutionally amended." 
We do not feel bound to follow that opinion. While i t is 
entitled to respect, and we have given it careful attention, it 
is not a decision of this court and therefore can have no 
weight as a precedent. 
In the litigated case of Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324, a t 
page 362, (1856), Ames, C. J . said: "The advice, or opinion, 
given * * * to the governor, or to either house of the as-
sembly, under the third section of the tenth article of the 
constitution, is not a decision of this court; and given as it 
must be, without the aid which the court derives, in adver-
sary cases, from able and experienced counsel, though i t may 
afford much light, from the reasonings or research displayed 
in it, can have no weight as a precedent." This court has 
since uniformly so regarded its advisory opinions. Allen vs. 
Danielson, 15 R. I. 480, (1887) ; In Re Election of United 
States Senators, 41 R. I. 211, (1918) ; Opinion to the Senate, 
51 R. I. 322, (1931). 
In applying this rule stated by Ames, C. J., supra, to the 
above mentioned opinion in 14 R. I., it should first be no-
ticed that the opinion itself shows that the resolution of the 
senate for submitting the questions to the judges was adopted 
March 20, 1883, and was received by them on March 24, and 
that their opinion was delivered six days later. Evidently 
they had no assistance from counsel. The last sentence of 
the opinion is as follows: "The questions are extremely im-
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portant, and we should have been glad of an opportunity to 
give them a more careful study, but under the request of the 
Senate for our opinion, 'without any unnecessary delay', we 
have thought it to be our duty to return our opinion as soon 
as we could, without neglecting other duties, prepare it." 
In a pamphlet entitled "Some Thoughts on the Constitu-
tion of Rhode Island" and published in 1884, Durfee, C. J., 
one of the judges, said that during the six days they "were 
holding court all the while" and that the question was not 
novel to him. though he "had not given it any special study." 
The whole opinion indicates that i t was ill-considered and 
hastily prepared. I t is not only not binding on us as a prece-
dent, but is also entitled to little or no weight, in spite of the 
ability and character of the men who joined in it. 
For the conclusion arrived at by the judges, viz., " that the 
mode provided in the constitution for the amendment there-
of is the only mode in which it can be constitutionally 
amended," the only reason of a legal nature given in the 
opinion is that the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio al-
terius" requires this conclusion. The opinion must stand or 
fall according as that reason is sound or unsound. In the 
first place, we are convinced that the judges misunderstood 
the maxim and its proper application. It does not mean, 
where two powers are not inconsistent, that the granting or 
affirmance of one of them is a prohibition of the exercise of 
the other. 
We agree fully with what the New York court of appeals 
said in Barto vs. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483, at 493, in which the 
question was whether the legislature could enact a law sub-
ject to the approval of a popular vote. "And I do not mean 
to lay much stress upon the implication arising from the 
express provision to submit a law creating a debt to the peo-
ple, and the silence of the constitution in relation to sub-
mitting to the people other matters of legislation. The maxim 
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'Expressio unius est exclusio alterius' is more applicable to 
deeds and contracts than to a constitution, and requires great 
caution in its application, in all cases." 
The question now under consideration relates even more 
to the fundamental right of the sovereign people to alter 
their constitution than to the power of the general assembly 
and we agree fully with what Judge Bradley, a former chief 
justice of this court, at page 26 of the pamphlet published 
by him entitled "The Methods of Changing the Constitution 
of the States, especially that of Rhode Island", (1885), said 
with reference to this maxim: "Any legislation which is to 
affect the sovereign power should not leave the right to mere 
inference. I t should be direct, especially in constitutions 
addressed to the popular mind and adopted by i t ; a great 
sovereign right should not be left to legal conjecture and im-
plication. The people, in such proceedings, say what they 
mean. They do not leave a negation of one power to be in-
ferred from the grant of another." Dwarris on Statutes, 712. 
All the pertinent provisions of our constitution should be 
considered in deciding the question whether the previously 
exercised power of the general assembly to call a constitu-
tional convention is prohibited by Article XI I I . The proper 
reasoning to be applied to that question and the proper an-
swer to it cannot in our judgment be better stated than they 
were at page 30 of that pamphlet, where, af ter stating the 
declarations in the preamble and Section 1 of Article I of 
the constitution, Judge Bradley said of the right to hold a 
convention: "This provision of our constitution is conclusive 
as to the existence of the right. I t is not referred to in these 
denials of the right. There is another provision of the con-
stitution which grants the power in question. Under the 
charter government, the General Assembly possessed all 
powers. Many of the people of the State preferred this pa-
triarchal government to the division of powers systematical-
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ly arranged in the usual State constitution. They yielded 
reluctantly to the pressure and persuasion of enemies and 
friends. While granting a constitution, they yet incorporate 
in it the provision that the General Assembly shall continue 
to exercise the powers they have hitherto exercised unless 
prohibited by the constitution. Among those powers was 
that of calling a constitutional convention. Had they meant 
to have excluded that power, they would have done so. The 
mere permission to the Assembly to propose amendments 
does not prohibit the other power. * * * I t certainly can-
not be claimed that the amendatory power given to the Gen-
eral Assembly cannot operate or exist while the reforming 
power over their constitution by the people, through a con-
vention and act of Assembly, also exists. The coexistence 
of these powers has been manifested in terms and in action 
under nearly fifty State constitutions in this country." 
The judges of this court in their advisory opinion on this 
question say that "as was clearly shown in Taylor vs. Place, 
supra, an implied is as effectual as an express prohibition." 
But what was decided in that case, in the famous opinion by 
Ames, C. J., was that the exercise by the general assembly of 
the judicial power previously exercised by i t is prohibited by 
section 1 of Article X of the constitution, "The judicial power 
of this state shall be vested in one supreme court, and in 
such inferior courts as the general assembly may, from time 
to time ordain and establish." The court properly held (pp. 
355-359) that this is equivalent to saying that all the judicial 
power of the state shall be so vested and gives exclusive 
judicial power to the courts, and that this necessarily ex-
cludes the existence of judicial power in any other depart-
ment of the government. The court says on page 359 that 
"the implication is unavoidable and equivalent to an express 
and explicit prohibition." 
The judges, near the beginning of the advisory opinion say, 
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"The ordinary rule is that whore power is given to do a 
thing in a particular way. there the affirmative words, mark-
ing out the particular way, prohibit all other ways by im-
plication, so that the particular way is the only way in 
which the power can be legally exercised." This way of 
slating the rule does not show its limitations or its true basis, 
which in that affirmative words may properly be construed 
8h operating negatively also, if, unless they are so construed, 
they will have no effective operation at all. The limitations 
and true basis of the rule are well brought out in North Staf-
ford Steel dc. Co. vs. Ward, L. R. 3 Exch. 173, (1868), one of 
the four authorities cited by our judges in support of their 
statement of the rule. There the articles of association of a 
company provided that in case all its shares of stock were 
not subscribed for, it could, if the directors should by resolu-
tion HO declare, carry on its business as a company from that 
time just as if its shares were all subscribed for. It was held 
that the company could not begin doing business until either 
its shares were all subscribed for or such resolution had been 
parted. The court properly said that unless the language was 
construed as having that effect it was meaningless. Neither 
this nor any of the other three authorities cited by our judges 
as supporting the rule as they state it seems to us to give any 
support to their application of such rule. 
The rule has been properly applied in cases to be discussed 
infra, which have held that if a legislature is given by a con-
stitution the power to propose directly to the people amend-
ments to the constitution, and the method of doing this is 
stated, that power cannot be legally exercised by any other 
method. What our judges did was to conclude in effect that, 
under the rule which they stated, the grant of power to the 
general assembly by Article XIII to frame and propose 
amendments, by a certain method, prohibited the general as-
sembly from exercising a power which it had independently 
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of that grant and which was a different but not an inconsist-
ent power, namely, the power to provide by law for the call-
ing of a convention to frame a new constitution or a revision 
of the existing one and propose it to the people for adoption 
or rejection. We believe that no support can be found for 
that conclusion. 
The power granted to the general assembly by Article X I I I 
can naturally and reasonably be viewed as an additional 
rather than an exclusive power and the recognized rule is that 
if two constructions of a constitutional provision are reason-
ably possible, one of which would diminish or restrict a fun-
damental right of the people and the other of which would 
not do so, the lat ter must be adopted. Yet our judges, by a 
highly technical course of reasoning, reached the conclusion 
that the people, by adopting a provision which permitted the 
general assembly to propose amendments to them directly 
in a specified manner, had divested themselves completely of 
their fundamental right to revise their constitution or to 
make a new one by the regular and normal method of a con-
vention, chosen by themselves for that purpose; and that this 
was so because they had thus impliedly prohibited the gen-
eral assembly from passing the measures necessary for the 
legal exercise of that right. 
Our judges in their opinion said: "One of the greatest of 
modern jurists, Chief Justice Shaw, was of the same way of 
thinking, and conjointly with his associates, declared it to be 
his opinion that the Constitution of Massachusetts is consti-
tutionally amendable only as therein provided." Opinion of 
the Justices, 6 Cush. 573. I t should be noticed that our 
judges interpreted the word "amendment" as including revi-
sion and the substitution of a new constitution, which, they 
said, could only differ from the existing one "in superstruc-
ture and detail" and would be a new constitution only in 
name. We are convinced that they were mistaken in this 
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view and that there is a real distinction between "an amend-
ment or amendments", as used in constitutions, and a revi-
sion or a new constitution, though it may be difficult in some 
cases to draw a clear line of demarcation between them. A 
careful consideration of the brief opinion written by Chief 
Justice Shaw convinces us that he had this distinction very 
clearly and definitely in mind and that he very carefully re-
frained from expressing any opinion upon the question 
whether the provision which was in the existing constitution 
of his state and which was substantially like our own Article 
XI I I prohibited the legislature from calling a constitutional 
convention or submitting to the people the matter of calling 
such a convention, for the purpose of revising the constitu-
tion or drafting a new one. In fact no such question was 
submitted to the judges of his court. 
The second question which the Massachusetts judges were 
asked to answer and which they answered first was as fol-
lows : "Can any specific and particular amendment or amend-
ments to the Constitution be made in any other manner than 
that prescribed in the ninth article of the amendments adopt-
ed in 1820?" The answer which they gave to this question 
was "that, under and pursuant to the existing Constitution, 
there is no authority given by any reasonable construction 
or necessary implication, by which any specific and particu-
lar amendment or amendments of the Constitution can be 
made, in any other manner than that prescribed in the ninth 
article of the amendments adopted in 1820." This was a per-
fectly correct answer, but it gave no support to the opinion 
of our judges in 1883. 
Presumably what our judges were relying upon, and the 
only part of the Massachusetts opinion which they, even upon 
hasty reading, might have construed as supporting their view 
was the next sentence of that opinion, as follows: "Consider-
ing that previous to 1820 no mode was provided by the Con-
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stitution for its own amendment, that no other power for that 
purpose, than in the mode alluded to, is anywhere given in 
the Constitution, by implication or otherwise, and that the 
mode thereby provided appears manifestly to have been care-
fully considered, and the power of altering the constitution 
thereby conferred to have been cautiously restrained and 
guarded, we think a strong implication arises against the 
existence of any other power, under the Constitution, for the 
same purposes." (Italics ours) 
In view of the fact that in the immediately preceding sen-
tence the judges were clearly discussing only "any specific 
and particular amendment or amendments" it is reasonable 
to infer that the judges in the latter sentence were still con-
sidering only such amendment or amendments, "for the same 
purpose" meaning "for the purpose of making any specific 
and particular amendment or amendments". This is the only 
construction of their language which would make it respon-
sive to the question which they were answering. But, be that 
as it may, the words italicized by us in the two quotations 
show clearly that the judges were only dealing with the mat-
ter of powers recognized as existing, by the constitution. That 
they were only dealing with that matter is also made perfect-
ly clear by the very beginning of their opinion, in which they 
say: "The court do not understand that it was the intention 
of the House of Representatives to request their opinion upon 
the natural right of the people in cases of great emergency, 
or upon the obvious failure of their existing Constitution to 
accomplish the objects for which it was designed, to provide 
for the amendment or alteration of their fundamental laws; 
nor what would be the effect of any change and alteration 
of their Constitution, made under such circumstances and 
sanctioned by the assent of the people. Such a view of the 
subject would involve the general question of natural rights, 
and the inherent and fundamental principles upon which civil 
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society is founded, rather than any question upon the nature, 
construction, or operation of the existing Constitution of the 
Commonwealth, and the laws made under it. We presume, 
therefore, that the opinion requested applies to the existing 
Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth, and the rights 
and powers derived from and under them. Considering the 
questions in this light, we are of opinion," etc. In this con-
nection it should be kept in mind that the Massachusetts con-
stitution under which these judges were then sitting con-
tained an express assertion of the right of the people "to in-
stitute government; and to reform, alter or totally change 
the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity and hap-
piness require it." I t is strange that the judges did not quote 
this language of the constitution instead of describing the 
right of the people as a natural right exercisable "in cases 
of great emergency, or upon the obvious failure of their ex-
isting constitution to accomplish the objects for which it was 
designed." However, they nowhere suggest that the exercise 
of this right would be revolutionary, if carried out by the 
usual and normal convention method with the concurrence 
of the legislature as the natural agency of the people for fa-
cilitating the exercise of that power. 
In view of what we have said above as to the Massachusetts 
opinion and of the fact that the constitution which then ex-
isted in that state did not contain any such clause as section 
10 of Article IV of our constitution, we are fully convinced 
that the Massachusetts opinion does not support in the slight-
est degree the opinion of our judges. 
Our views, above stated, as to the true meaning and effect 
of the Massachusetts opinion is in accordance with the views 
of all the text writers who to our knowledge have discussed 
it. Judge Jameson in "Constitutional Conventions", § 574, 
says with reference to the opinion of our judges: "As to the 
weight to be accorded this opinion, we will only now observe, 
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that so fa r as i t is based upon tha t of the Massachusetts 
judges, it is wholly without force, because the two cases are 
very dissimilar in their facts, insomuch that, while it is pos-
sible to approve the opinion of the Massachusetts judges, it 
does not follow, according to the principles propounded in it, 
that that of the Rhode Island judges is to be approved. In 
the Massachusetts case, where the Constitution had provided 
a mode in which 'specific and particular amendments' might 
be made through the agency of the legislature, the question 
put to the judges was whether 'any specific and particular 
amendment or amendments' could be made in any other man-
ner than that provided in the Constitution. To this question 
the answer ought, according to the principles announced by 
both courts, to have been in the negative, since it inquired 
as to the lawfulness of doing the same thing in a different 
way from that prescribed by the Constitution. But that 
opinion could not properly be cited as authority in the Rhode 
Island case, where the question was whether, if a Convention 
were called 'to f rame a new Constitution of the State*, and it 
were adopted by the people, it would be valid, the existing 
Constitution having provided a mode in which amendments 
thereof might be made, but not having authorized the call of 
a Convention? Here, as we shall see in a subsequent section, 
the proposition was to do a different thing, that is, to frame 
a new Constitution, in a different way, and therefore accord-
ing to all authorities the maxim could have no application: 
in other words, because the people could not do the same 
thing in a different way, it does not follow that they could 
not do a different thing in a different way." 
Holcombe, on "State Government in the United States", 
at page 97 of the revised edition, also says with reference to 
the opinion of our judges: " I t was contended that there was 
precedent for this opinion in an earlier opinion of the su-
preme court of Massachusetts. A careful study of the opin-
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ion of the Massachusetts court, however, shows that its opin-
ion related to another matter. In no state has the opinion 
of the Rhode Island court been followed." To the same gen-
eral effect are Dodd on "The Revision and Amendment of 
State Constitutions", p. 45, and Hoar on "Constitutional Con-
ventions", pp. 46, 47. 
The legislature of Massachusetts in 1852, when no emer-
gency existed, submitted to the voters the question of holding 
a constitutional convention, the question was answered af-
firmatively; and the convention was held in 1853. Our views 
as to the Massachusetts opinion are in accord with the views 
and actions of the members of that convention, which sat un-
der the sanction of the legislature and the people to revise 
the very same constitution involved in that opinion. Marcus 
Morton, one of the four judges who gave the opinion, sat as 
a delegate in that convention, as did also Joel Parker, a for-
mer Chief Justice of New Hampshire, and both expressed the 
opinion that the convention was legal. That view seems to 
have been universally accepted. See Jameson, supra, § 574a. 
This convention was not mentioned by our judges in their 
opinion nor were any of a number of other conventions which 
had been held under constitutions that contained provisions 
for their amendment by the method of legislative proposal 
and no provisions for constitutional conventions. They failed 
also to cite a number of previous cases in other states which 
supported the legality of conventions similarly held. Besides 
the Massachusetts and New York conventions above dis-
cussed, conventions were held before 1883 in the following 
states, which at the time had constitutions containing provi-
sions for amendments in the legislative proposal mode, but 
none with regard to conventions: Arkansas, 1874; Louisiana, 
1852,1879; Missouri, 1845,1861, and 1865; New Jersey, 1844; 
Pennsylvania, 1872; Tennessee, 1870; Texas, 1875; See Jame-
son, 210, § 219, note 1; 560, § 537a, note 2; 601, § 570 and 
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note 1; and Appendix B., pp. 643-655. So fa r as we have been 
able to ascertain, the validity of any of these conventions has 
never been questioned by any text writer or in any cases ex-
cept a few in which it has been sustained. Many other con-
ventions have been held since 1883 under similar conditions. 
These were all recognized as valid and some of them have 
been judicially sustained, as will be shown infra. 
Briefs submitted to us in support of the opinion of our 
judges in 1883 cite two Rhode Island cases as supporting 
their position. One of these cases is State vs. Kane 15 R. I. 
395, (1886), decided by the same judges except that Judge 
Wilbur had replaced Judge Carpenter. At that time the fifth 
amendment to our constitution provided: "The manufacture 
and sale of intoxicating liquors to be used as a beverage shall 
be prohibited. The general assembly shall provide by law 
for carrying this article into effect." Parenthetically, it 
should be noticed how closely the language of the second of 
the two sentences quoted parallels the language of the second 
sentence of section 1 of Article IV of our constitution, "The 
general assembly shall pass all laws necessary to carry this 
constitution into effect." I t is obvious that in the amendment 
the sentence means that the general assembly shall pass all 
laws necessary at any time or from time to time to enforce 
the amendment; and this supports the view, set forth near 
the beginning of this present opinion, that the corresponding 
sentence in Article IV should be interpreted in the same way. 
The statute involved in the case prohibited the sale of in-
toxicating liquors for beverage purposes and for certain other 
purposes. The defendant argued that the inclusion in the 
prohibitory statute of the sale of intoxicating liquors for 
these other purposes made the statute repugnant to the 
amendment, which only required the general assembly to pro-
hibit the sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. 
With reference to this argument the court, a t page 397, says: 
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"The defendant's argument rests upon the legal maxim, Ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius, which, literally translated, 
signifies, the expression of one is the exclusion of the other. 
The maxim is often applied in construing written instru-
ments, particularly grants, to narrow their scope to what is 
expressed in them, by the exclusion of what, but for the ex-
pression, would be implied. Thus, if a lot, with no access 
to it save over the grantor's land, be conveyed with the ex-
press grant of a particular way, any way which might other-
wise be implied will be excluded." This language certainly 
does not support the advisory opinion of 1883. 
A little farther along on the same page the court, in show-
ing that the maxim did not apply to the case, said: "We can 
see nothing in the first clause of the fifth amendment which 
warrants such an implication. The second clause is a com-
mand to the General Assembly to provide by law for carry-
ing the first clause into effect. Of course, if the General As-
sembly had previously had no power to legislate on the sub-
ject, this command would confer by implication the power 
required for its own execution. But the General Assembly 
had power, before the amendment, not only to prohibit the 
sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, but also to restrict 
and regulate their sale for other purposes. The two powers, 
if they may be called two, are not inconsistent. Why, then, 
should an express command to exercise the one be tantamount 
to an abrogation of the other? We see no reason why it 
should. This view is not in conflict with the opinion of the 
judges In Re The Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649. 
There was in that matter no command to the General Assem-
bly to prohibit the doing of a thing for a particular purpose, 
but a command to the General Assembly to proceed in a par-
ticular manner in amending the Constitution, if it proceeded 
at all. The distinction is this: That it is entirely feasible 
to prohibit the doing of a thing for one purpose, and a t the 
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same time to prohibit or restrict, or to refrain from prohibit-
ing or restricting, the doing of it for other purposes; whereas 
it is impossible to make an amendment to the Constitution 
in the manner prescribed, and at the same time to make it in 
a different manner. Our conclusion is that the amendment 
has no effect beyond what is expressed and what may be im-
plied to carry out what is expressed in it, and consequently 
that the General Assembly still has all the powers, not in-
consistent with the amendment so construed, which i t pre-
viously had." The court in this quotation correctly states a 
limitation to the proper application of the maxim, saying in 
substance, that a power which would otherwise exist in a 
legislature to do one thing is not taken away by a constitu-
tional command to exercise in a certain way another power 
to do a different thing, the two powers not being inconsistent 
with each other. But in our judgment it fails utterly in its 
labored efforts to reconcile its advisory opinion of three years 
before with this statement of the limitation to the proper ap-
plication of the maxim. In trying to do this it first begs the 
whole question in saying that in the matter previously before 
it there was "a command to the General Assembly to proceed 
in a particular manner in amending the Constitution, if it 
proceeded at all," whereas in fact Article X I I I only permit-
ted the general assembly to propose to the people an amend-
ment to the constitution and then commanded it to follow a 
certain procedure in doing this, if the general assembly chose 
to initiate a constitutional change in that way; and the gen-
eral assembly admittedly had another power to do a different 
thing, (namely, to initiate proceedings for the holding of a 
convention), which would exist otherwise, i.e., unless pro-
hibited by the constitution: and the two powers are entirely 
consistent with each other. To our minds it is clearly beside 
the point to say, as the court does, that "it is impossible to 
make an amendment to the Constitution in the manner pre-
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scribed and at the same time to make it in a different man-
ner." We cannot see that "at the same time" has anything 
to do with the case, and even at the same time the general as-
sembly could consistently pass a resolution for proposing a 
special amendment to be submitted to the people and pass an 
act or resolution with regard to a convention to consider a 
general revision of the constitution. 
In our judgment the opinion in State vs. Kane, supra, 
greatly lessened rather than increased the weight to be given 
to the advisory opinion, by exposing the fallaciousness of the 
reasoning in the earlier opinion. 
Higgins vs. Tax Assessors of Pawtucket, 27 R. I. 401, 
(1905), is also cited in the same brief in support of the ad-
visory opinion, but in our judgment the opinion in tha t case 
also lessened rather than increased the weight to be given to 
the advisory opinion. Section 1 of Article X I I of amend-
ments to the constitution, adopted in 1903, provides, among 
other things, that the supreme court "shall have power to 
issue prerogative writs" and that "the inferior courts shall 
have such jurisdiction as may, from time to time, be pre-
scribed by law." The question was whether, under the maxim 
above referred to, the provision granting to the supreme court 
jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs operated by implica-
tion to withhold this jurisdiction from the inferior courts. 
The court answered the question in the negative, rightly hold-
ing that the maxim was not applicable to the case. In sup-
port of this holding it quoted with approval the following 
from the opinion in Delafield vs. State of Illinois, 2 Hill, 159 
at 167: "As a grant of jurisdiction is not in its own nature 
exclusive, it can only be made so either by express words or 
by necessary implication." To us this language seems just 
as applicable to a constitutional provision vesting in a legis-
lature a permissive power, with only the method of its exer-
cise made mandatory. 
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Yet the court in the Higgins case says: "The maxim is un-
doubtedly a sound rule of construction in cases where it is 
applicable. Thus it was invoked by the justices of this court 
in their opinion given to the senate, In Re The Constitutional 
Convention, 14 R. I. 649, which is cited by the respondent. 
There it was held that the specified method of amending the 
constitution was the only lawful method; and it is difficult 
to imagine a reason for selecting one method out of several 
possible ones if all the others were still to remain legal and 
available." This is not convincing. At the time when the 
constitution was adopted there were only two methods of 
changing a constitution which were recognized as possible, 
one the convention method with legislative concurrence and 
ratification by the people, and the other the legislative pro-
posal method with ratification by the people. The former of 
these was recognized as legal unless forbidden by the consti-
tution, while the lat ter was regarded as legal only when ex-
pressly authorized by the constitution. Therefore, if the 
makers of our constitution wished to make available the sim-
pler and cheaper legislative proposal method, as an addi-
tional one, suitable for specific amendments, we do not find 
i t "difficult to imagine a reason" for putting in a special pro-
vision for that method without putting in any express and 
unnecessary provision for the convention method, which 
alone is suitable for a general revision. 
Many cases outside of Rhode Island have been cited for 
and against the advisory opinion of our judges. All the most 
important of these will now be discussed. 
Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39, (1874), was decided under 
the constitution of 1838, which contained a provision like our 
Article X I I I and no provision for a convention. The "Dec-
laration of Rights" affirmed the "inalienable and indefeasible 
right of the people to alter, reform, or abolish their govern-
ment in such manner as they may think proper." Yet a con-
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vention was called in 1873, pursuant to a legislative act, 
which was passed after a favorable vote of the people; and 
the new constitution framed and proposed by the convention 
was afterwards adopted by the people and went into opera-
tion. The act which called the convention provided that "the 
election to decide for or against the adoption of the new con-
stitution or specific amendments shall be conducted as the 
general elections are now by law conducted." The conven-
tion passed an ordinance for submitting the new constitution 
to the people, which provided for a different manner of hold-
ing the election. The suit was brought to enjoin the holding 
of the election in Philadelphia in this manner. 
The court held that the injunction should be issued on the 
ground that the act was valid and controlled the manner of 
holding the election and that any other manner would be 
revolutionary in its nature. I t discussed fully the whole mat-
ter of changing the constitution by the convention method 
and approved it as a proper method of making effectual the 
right of the people set forth in the declaration of rights. The 
court said at page 47: "The words 'in such manner as they 
may think proper,' in the declaration of rights, embrace but 
three known recognized modes by which the whole people, 
the state, can give their consent to an alteration of an exist-
ing lawful frame of government, viz.: 
"1. The mode provided in the existing constitution. 
"2. A law, as the instrumental process of raising the 
body for revision and conveying to it the powers of 
the people. 
"3. A revolution. 
"The first two are peaceful means through which the con-
sent of the people to alteration is obtained, and by which the 
existing government consents to be displaced without revolu-
tion. The government gives its consent, either by pursuing 
the mode provided in the constitution, or by passing a law 
\ 
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to call a convention. If consent be not so given by the exist-
ing government the remedy of the people is in the third mode 
—revolution. 
"When a law becomes the instrumental process of amend-
ment, it is not because the legislature possesses any inherent 
power to change the existing constitution through a conven-
tion, but because it is the only means through which an au-
thorized consent of the whole people, the entire state, can be 
lawfully obtained in a state of peace. Irregular action, where-
by a certain number of the people assume to act for the whole, 
is evidently revolutionary." This applies fully to our own 
situation, except that, as set forth in this opinion, supra, our 
constitution by section 10 of Article IV clearly authorized 
the general assembly to exercise the power, which i t had fre-
quently exercised previously, to provide for the calling of a 
constitutional convention. We do not see how this approval 
by the supreme court of Pennsylvania of the convention 
method of changing the constitution, although the constitu-
tion only provided for the legislative proposal method, can 
properly be called a dictum, since the court gave this ap-
proval as i ts reason for granting the injunction and not the 
reason that the convention was an illegal and revolutionary 
body. Nor do we see how the opinion in that case can be rec-
onciled with that of our judges by reason of the different lan-
guage of the declarations of rights in the two constitutions, 
since, if the Pennsylvania constitution, by providing only for 
the method of legislative proposal, had prohibited the conven-
tion method of changing the constitution, the lat ter method 
would have been as clearly revolutionary and invalid under 
the Pennsylvania declaration of rights as under our own. 
The question of the validity of the convention method in 
Pennsylvania was squarely raised and decided in the case of 
Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59, (1874), in which citizens and 
taxpayers sought an injunction against the secretary of the 
0 
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commonwealth and other officers to prevent them from tak-
ing the necessary action for holding an election on the ques-
tion of the adoption of the new constitution in accordance 
with the same "ordinance" of the convention which is men-
tioned in the above discussion of Wells vs. Bain, supra. The 
first ground urged in favor of the injunction was "that the 
act was unconstitutional and repugnant to the tenth article 
of the constitution," which provided for the making of 
amendments to the constitution by the legislative proposal 
method, no other method being provided for. The bill prayed 
that both that act and the prior act by which the question of 
holding a convention had been submitted to the people be de-
clared unconstitutional and void. The case was heard on de-
murrer to the bill. 
It was heard first in the court of common pleas of Alle-
gheny county before Stowe, J., and he sustained the validity 
of the acts in question and denied the injunction. In his opin-
ion he says, at page 63, that it is first "necessary to examine 
whether there is anything in the constitution, as urged in the 
second proposition, which directly or by necessary legal im-
plication takes away such a fundamental right, as we have 
suggested, in case it existed, where there is no constitutional 
restriction." He then continues as follows: " I t is urged, and 
with much apparent force, that because the constitution in 
the tenth article 'of amendments' provides a certain and care-
fully-defined way for amending the fundamental law, the 
well-recognized legal maxim ordinarily applied to the con-
struction of deeds and written instruments, as well as acts 
of legislation, 'Expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' leads 
to the fixed legal presumption that no amendment can, under 
the constitution, be made to it, except in the way thus 
especially provided. 
''Custom and usage have also been allowed to aid in inter-
preting Acts of Parliament, 'and that exposition,' says Lord 
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Coke, 'shall be preferred which is applied by constant use 
and experience.' I t is by no means certain that the maxim 
alluded to should find any favor as a general rule of inter-
pretation of an instrument like a constitution, which must 
of a necessity deal in generalities, but at all events, if so ap-
plied, it must in all such cases be considered as overcome by 
any established or common usage or understanding, indicat-
ing a different conclusion." He then sets forth what Jame-
son said, "with great force", upon this question, cites Barto 
vs. Himrod, supra, mentions the opinion of the justices in 
Massachusetts and the convention held in that state in 1853, 
and mentions twenty-five conventions which had been "called 
by the legislatures of the various states, without any special 
authorization in their constitutions." He then says, at page 
65, "The conclusion that I have drawn from all this is, that 
there is underlying our whole system of American govern-
ment a principle of acknowledged right in the people to 
change their constitutions, except where especially prohibited 
in a constitution itself, in all cases and at all times, whether 
there is a way provided in their constitution or not, by the 
interposition of the legislature, and the calling of a conven-
tion, as was done in the case in hand." At page 66 he adds: 
" I t follows then, that the action of the legislature in author-
izing a vote of the people on the question of the amendment 
of their constitution, and subsequently by another act au-
thorizing the election of delegates, was a legal exercise of 
legislative power, and constitutional, unless something in the 
acts themselves is in conflict with some constitutional provi-
sion." 
On appeal to the supreme court, that court in its opinion 
first said: "The change made by the people in their political 
institutions, by the adoption of the proposed Constitution 
since this decree, forbids an inquiry into the merits of this 
case. The question is no longer judicial, but in affirming the 
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decree we must not seem to sanction any doctrine in the opin-
ion, dangerous to the liberties of the people. The claim of 
absolute sovereignty in the convention, apparently sustained 
in the opinion, is of such magnitude and overwhelming im-
portance to the people themselves, it cannot be passed unno-
ticed." 
The supreme court found no fault with the reasoning and 
conclusion of the lower court on the matter of the validity 
of the convention. Indeed it said at page 72: "The calling 
of a convention, and regulating its action by law, is not for-
bidden in the constitution. It is a conceded manner, through 
which the people may exercise the right reserved in the bill 
of rights. I t falls, therefore, within the protection of the bill 
of rights as a very manner in which the people may proceed 
to amend their constitution, and delegate the only powers 
they intend to confer, and as the means whereby they may, 
by limitation, defend themselves against those who are called 
in to exercise their powers. The legislature may not confer 
powers by law inconsistent with the rights, safety and liber-
ties of the people, because no consent to do this can be im-
plied, but they may pass limitations in favor of the essential 
rights of the people. The right of the people to restrain their 
delegates by la w cannot be denied, unless the power to call a 
convention by law, and the right of self-protection, be also de-
nied. I t is, therefore, the right of the people and not of the 
legislature to be put by law above the convention, and to re-
quire the delegates to submit their work for ratification or 
disapproval. * * * To estop them from their right to accept 
or reject the work of the convention, there must be an evident 
channel pointed out through which their power passed to the 
convention to ordain at pleasure a constitution or binding or-
dinances." 
The court then, after considerable discussion of the matter, 
says at the end of its opinion: "In conclusion, we find nothing 
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in the Bill of Rights, in the vote under Act of 1871, or the au-
thority conferred in the Act of 1872, nothing in the nature 
of delegated power, or in the constitution of the convention 
itself, which can justify an assumption that a convention so 
called, constituted, organized and limited, can take from the 
people their sovereign right to rat i fy or reject a constitution 
or ordinance framed by it, or can infuse present life and vigor 
into its work before its adoption by the people." 
With this last point we are not now concerned, but on the 
point now under consideration in this present opinion the 
court seems clearly to have approved the opinion of the lower 
court. 
In Collier vs. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100, (1854), the statement 
which is of interest to us is only a dictum, as the question at 
issue was whether under the constitutional provision for 
amendment by the process of legislative proposal and sub-
mission to the people, an amendment could be validly 
adopted without complying fully with such provision, and 
the court held that it could not. The declaration of rights 
affirmed the right of the people to alter the government in 
such manner as they may think expedient and there was no 
reference in the constitution to a convention. 
The provision in the declaration of rights was perhaps 
somewhat more sweeping as to the manner of making altera-
tions than the corresponding one in our constitution, but the 
same reasoning, if sound, could have been applied as was ap-
plied by our judges, namely, that the people, by providing in 
the constitution for its amendment by legislative proposal 
and saying nothing about a convention, had limited them-
selves to the former method as the only manner to be followed 
in making constitutional changes. Yet the court in the Ala-
bama case on pages 108 and 109 says: "The constitution can 
be amended in but two ways, either by the people, who orig-
inally framed it, or in the mode prescribed by the instrument 
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itself. * * * We entertain no doubt, that, to change the con-
stitution in any other mode than by a convention, every requi-
sition which is demanded by the instrument itself, must be 
observed, and the omission of any one is fatal to the amend-
ment." 
This language was quoted at page 543 in the opinion in the 
case of Koehler & Lange vs. Hill, 60 la., (1883), in which pre-
cisely the same issue was involved as in the Alabama case, 
and that issue only, and was decided in the same way. In 
one of the two briefs which were submitted to us by counsel 
who were delegated by the Rhode Island Bar Association to 
prepare and submit briefs on this matter, being the one in 
opposition to any power in the general assembly to provide 
for calling a convention, that case is cited as supporting the 
soundness of the Rhode Island opinion. The constitution of 
Iowa as in effect at the time of this opinion, and down at least 
to 1917, is shown in "The State Constitutions" by Kettlebor-
ough. Section 2 of Article I was as follows: "All political 
power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted 
for the protection, security, and benefit of the people, and 
they have the right, at all times, to alter or reform the same, 
whenever the public good may require it." I t contained pro-
visions for both methods of changing it, the method by legis-
lative proposal being substantially the same as ours except 
that only a majority vote was required for adoption. 
I t was claimed by those who were trying to sustain the 
amendment, the validity of which was in question, that it 
had been proposed to the people in accordance with that 
method and adopted by vote of the people. The court held 
it invalid solely on the ground that according to the legisla-
tive records the proposed amendment as acted on by the sec-
ond legislature and submitted to the people differed in a small 
but material respect from the form in which it was passed 
by the first legislature. 
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We do not find anything in the long opinions in that case 
which supports the advisory opinion of our judges. Indeed 
the court by its quotations from the opinions in Wells vs. 
Bain, supra, and Collier vs. Frierson, supra , seems clearly to 
recognize the validity of changes made by the convention 
method with the concurrence of the legislature, even under a 
constitution which did not provide for that method and did 
provide for the legislative proposal method. 
Of the other cases outside of Rhode Island which are cited 
as supporting the advisory opinion of our judges, State vs. 
McBride, 4 Mo. 313, (1836), and State vs. Tufly, 19 Nev. 391, 
(1887), simply decide, as did Collier vs. Frierson, supra, and 
Koehler & Lange vs. Hill, supra, that, if an amendment is at-
tempted by the legislative proposal method under the con-
stitution, the provisions made by the constitution for that 
method must be strictly followed or else the amendment is 
not valid even though ratified by a majority vote of the peo-
ple. These cases do not even contain any dicta in support of 
the opinion of our judges, and State vs. Tufly, supra, contains 
dicta to the contrary. In the special brief above mentioned 
the court in the lat ter case is quoted as saying: "We conclude 
that amendments to the constitution can be made only in the 
mode provided by the instrument itself." But the Nevada 
constitution, which it was referring to, was like the one in 
the Iowa case in that it had an express provision for the con-
vention method as well as one for the legislative proposal 
method. 
Another case similarly cited is State vs. City of New Or-
leans, 163 La. 777, (1927). I t is t rue that the court said at 
page 783: "The Constitution, by section 1, Article XXI , ex-
pressly points out when and how amendments to the Consti-
tution may be proposed and considered by the Legislature, 
and adopted by a vote of the people, when so submitted. The 
manner of proposing and adopting amendments to the Con-
42 
stitution as thus provided is exclusive. The Constitution can-
not be altered, changed, affected, or amended in any other 
manner, unless express and direct permission is given to the 
Legislature by the Constitution itself." But the court had 
said that the legislative act, which was in question and did 
not concern a convention and was declared void, was in its 
terms contrary to the constitution; was not a constitutional 
amendment; did not purport to be other than an act of the 
legislature; and did not pretend to amend any article of the 
constitution. The statement above quoted then was not at 
all necessary to the decision of the case and all that the court 
said as to how the constitution may be altered was the state-
ment above quoted, which was not supported by any reason-
ing or citation of authority. 
It is entitled to very little, if any, weight, especially in view 
of what the same court said directly to the contrary in the 
earlier case of State vs. American Sugar Refining Co., 137 La. 
407, (1915). There the validity and regularity of the consti-
tution of 1913, framed and adopted by the convention method, 
were squarely sustained by the court, although all the pro-
ceedings involved took place while the constitution of 1898 
was in force, which provided for the legislative proposal 
method of amending the constitution and contained no refer-
ence to constitutional conventions. The court, at page 414, 
says that this silence of the organic law on the subject of 
conventions "leaves the question of calling such convention 
to the representatives of the people in legislative session con-
vened", citing in support of this Cooley on Const. Lim., 7th 
ed. 56, now 8th ed. 81. We do not believe that the court in 
1927, by the language above quoted from its opinion, intended 
to overrule its decision in 1915. It is more likely that it was 
not thinking at all about the convention method of altering 
the constitution. 
Supporters of the opinion of our judges have quoted to us 
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another statement from Judge Cooler's work, where, after 
speaking of the power of the people "to control and alter at 
will the law which they have made", he says at page 85: "But 
the will of the people to this end can only be expressed in the 
legitimate modes by which such a body politic can act, and 
which must either be prescribed by the Constitution whose 
revision or amendment is sought, or by an act of the legisla-
tive department of the State, which alone would be author-
ized to speak for the people upon this subject, and to point 
out a mode for the expression of their will in the absence of 
any provision for amendment or revision contained in the 
Constitution itself." This is a perfectly correct statement, 
that if a constitution is silent on the subject of its own altera-
tion, the legislature and only the legislature is authorized 
to provide an explicit and authentic mode for ascertaining 
and effectuating the will of the people on this subject, i.e., by 
the convention method. 
What is done by those who rely on the above quotation as 
supporting the advisory opinion is to construe it as equiva-
lent to the converse of the statement, i.e., as saying that if the 
constitution does make any provision with regard to its own 
amendment or alteration, the legislature is thus deprived of 
the above described authority which otherwise it alone would 
have. Judge Cooley does not make that converse statement 
anywhere and in thus construing his language those who thus 
cite it are making the same mistake as our judges made in 
construing Article X I I I of our constitution. In a footnote 
to the above quotation he quotes from Jameson's work a long 
passage, which ends with this sentence: "Nor is it true * * * 
that the giving to the legislature, in a constitution, express 
power to recommend specific amendments to that instrument 
involves, by implication, the denial to that body of power to 
call conventions for a general revision." Moreover, Jameson 
in other places in his work clearly and strongly rejects the 
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reasoning of our judges and sustains the above-mentioned au-
thority of a legislature, except so far as clearly and definitely 
taken away or limited by the constitution, and Cooley, about 
a half page further in his discussion of this general subject, 
says, with regard to this work by Jameson: "This work is so 
complete and satisfactory in its treatment of the general sub-
ject as to leave little to be said by anyone who shall after-
wards attempt to cover the same." 
After discussing other questions as to the changing of con-
stitutions, Jameson at page 601 puts this question, "When 
the Constitution makes no provision, then, for amendments, 
save in the legislative mode, can a Convention be lawfully 
called?" He refers to numerous instances in which conven-
tions have been called under these circumstances and dis-
cusses the question on principle. Then he discusses the Mas-
sachusetts and Rhode Island advisory opinions and some of 
the cases already discussed in this present opinion and the 
maxim above referred to and says at page 610: "Obviously, 
as we have before remarked, while it may, without absurdity, 
be claimed that the maxim operates to prohibit the doing of 
the same thing in a different way from that prescribed by 
law, it cannot be claimed to prohibit the doing of a different 
thing in a different way. Now, it is very clear on the face 
of the constitutional provisions authorizing amendments 
through the agency of the legislature, as compared with those 
authorizing the call of Conventions, that the purpose of the 
former is different from that of the lat ter ; in other words, 
the thing authorized to be done by the one class of provisions 
is a different thing from that authorized to be done by the 
other. Thus, the purpose of the legislative mode is to bring 
about amendments which are few and simple and independ-
ent ; and on the other hand, that of the mode through Con-
ventions is to revise the entire Constitution, with a view to 
propose either a new one, or, as the greater includes the less, 
to propose specific and particular amendments to it. Where 
a few particular amendments only are desired, if the Consti-
tution provides for both modes, the legislative mode should 
be employed; but if a revision is or may be desired, the mode 
by a Convention only is appropriate, or, as we expect to show, 
permissible. * # * To say, then, that the purpose of the two 
modes is the same, is to say that a part is equal to, or the 
same as, the whole." 
At page 615 he says: "Recurring, then, to the question 
whether, where a Constitution contains no provision for 
amendments save in the legislative mode, a Convention 
can be called, the answer must be, both upon principle 
and upon precedent, that a Convention can be called, 
certainly when a revision of the whole Constitution is 
desired, to determine what amendments, if any, are 
needed, or, if deemed advisable, to frame a new Con-
stitution. In general, whenever a Convention is called, the 
intention is to authorize a revision of the entire Constitu-
tion, though, upon its meeting, the result of its labors may 
be only to recommend specific amendments. But, where the 
legislative mode is adopted, it is never intended to do more 
than to formulate certain specific amendments, though, in 
one or two cases where constitutional commissions have been 
employed, at tempts have been made to adapt the legislative 
mode to the making of general revisions,—attempts which 
have not met -with such success as to justify their repetition." 
At page 44 Dodd, in his work above quoted from, says: " I t 
has now become the established rule that where the constitu-
tion contains no provision for the calling of a convention, but 
has no provision expressly confining amendment to a partic-
ular method, the legislature may provide by law for the call-
ing of a convention—that is, the enactment of such a law is 
within the power of the legislature unless expressly forbid-
den, and is considered a regular exercise of legislative 
power." 
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Hoar, pp. 52, 56, 57, takes a somewhat different view from 
that of the text writers just quoted as to the basic princi-
ples involved, being of the opinion that usually the holding 
of a convention is a proceeding over and beyond the constitu-
tion rather than under it, but arrives at substantially the 
same result. 
I t should be noticed that there is no need in this state of 
deciding between these points of view as to the theory of the 
matter, since it is clear, as we have above stated, that the 
general assembly has the power under our constitution, by 
section 10 of Article IV, to initiate a convention, unless pro-
hibited by the constitution itself. Therefore, since in our 
opinion this power is not prohibited, a convention thus initi-
ated, chosen and held would be constitutionally as well as 
legally held. 
Holcombe, supra, in what we believe to be the latest book 
which deals with the question (1926), says at page 96: "The 
question therefore arises, what is the status of the constitu-
tional convention in those states where its existence is not 
expressly recognized in the written constitution? Such states 
might logically be divided into two classes, those in which no 
express provision for amendment is contained in the written 
constitution, and those in w7hich some provision is made for 
amendment through the agency of the ordinary legislature." 
After discussing the first class and concluding that in them 
the legislatures have been authorized by the unwritten law 
of their constitutions to start the machinery of constitutional 
revision by means of special conventions, he then discusses 
the second class of states and the advisory opinions in Mas-
sachusetts and Rhode Island. After saying, as quoted supra, 
that the former opinion related to another matter and that 
in no state has the latter opinion been followed, he adds at 
page 97: "On the contrary, the practice of the other eleven 
states has been based on the recognition of the right of the 
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people through their representatives to provide by law for the 
calling of a convention. This right is construed from the fact 
that the people undoubtedly possessed the right in the begin-
ning, and have not parted with it by expressly confining 
amendment to some other method." 
Other cases, not already cited, strongly support this view. 
State vs. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81, (1896); State vs. Powell, 77 Miss. 
543, (1900), semble; Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind. 336,(1912), 
semble; Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, (1917), semble. 
In Ellingham vs. Dye, supra, the court held that a legisla-
ture, authorized by the constitution to proceed by the legis-
lative proposal method, could not, under the guise of amend-
ing the constitution, f rame a new constitution and submit it 
to the people for adoption; and the court enjoined the sub-
mission of the new constitution. I t discussed thoroughly the 
entire matter of changing a constitution by the two methods, 
and by way of dictum agreed fully with Jameson's view that, 
when only the legislative proposal method was provided for 
in the constitution but the convention method was not 
clearly forbidden, the legislature could legally initiate the 
convention method. 
In Bennett vs. Jackson, supra, the court, acting under the 
same constitution as in Ellingham vs. Dye, which provided 
for the legislative proposal method, but made no provision as 
to a constitutional convention, says at page 538: "That the 
people of the State have a right to create a new constitution 
is conceded by all parties, the only difference of opinion be-
ing as to the manner of bringing about that result," i. e., as 
to whether the legislature must first obtain at an election the 
approval of the people for the holding of a convention. 
As a result of our examination of all the cases and text 
books on the subject, which are known to us and to which 
we have had access, we are convinced that the authority in 
support of the advisory opinion of our judges is practically 
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negligible and that the weight of authority in opposition to 
it is overwhelming. We are convinced that the opinion is 
also against sound reasoning and principle. Our conclusion 
is that it should be disregarded and that the convention 
method would be a proper and legal method of altering our 
constitution or framing and adopting a new one, even if the 
special provisions of our constitution, to which we called at-
tention near the beginning of this opinion, were not present. 
And when we take into consideration the language quoted 
from our bill of rights and sections 1 and 10 of Article IV, 
that conclusion is in our judgment clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We therefore answer in the affirmative the first and 
primary question propounded to us. 
We see no difficulty in subsidiary question (b) if it be un-
derstood that the governor is to act only upon instructions 
from the general assembly and in no sense to have delegated 
to him power which may be exercised only by the general 
assembly. To call for the convention is a function of the 
general assembly and cannot be left to the discretion of the 
governor. The legislature cannot delegate to the governor 
the absolute authority to fix the date of the convention elec-
tion but it may authorize him to fix the date of the election 
within some definite period prescribed by the legislature it-
self. I t is now well established that such limited delegation 
of legislative power is not within the scope of the rule that 
delegated power cannot be delegated. We therefore answer 
(b) in the affirmative, subject to our understanding of the 
question as here expressed. 
This brings us to a consideration of subsidiary question 
(c). A constitutional convention is an assembly of the 
people themselves acting through their duly elected dele-
gates. The delegates in such an assembly must therefore 
come from the people who choose them for this high purpose 
and this purpose alone. They cannot be imposed upon the 
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convention by any other authority. Neither the legislature 
nor any other department of the government has the power 
to select delegates to such a convention. The delegates elected 
by and from the people, and only such delegates, may and of 
right have either a voice or a vote therein. 
It will not, however, be contrary to this principle if the 
general assembly provides that the governor or some other 
person shall s tart the convention machinery by calling it to 
order- and presiding temporarily until it shall choose its own 
president, which is the first business of the convention. Noth-
ing should intervene until this is done as the convention is 
not organized as such until it has a directing head. Any 
departure from the regular order of business will be promo-
tive of disorder. In this respect the convention should be 
vigilant to protect its integrity and its independence. No 
one, not a delegate, no matter how exalted his station in the 
existing government, can be assured either a voice or a vote 
in such a convention unless he comes there with a commis-
sion from the people as their delegate, although the conven-
tion itself may if it please invite him to address it or give it 
counsel, in which case he will be in the convention by invita-
tion and not by virtue of his office. 
We therefore answer question (c) in the negative. 
Subsidiary question (d) must be answered differently ac-
cording as the convention is called by the legislature alone 
or called by the legislature af ter an affirmative vote there-
for on the part of the people. In the first instance the legis-
lature summons the convention without permitting the peo-
ple to limit the power of their delegates or to prescribe the 
manner in which they shall proceed to perform the task 
entrusted to them. Under such circumstances, to permit the 
general assembly to set bounds to the authority of the con-
vention is to exalt the legislature, the agent, above its prin-
cipal, the people. This cannot be. In such a case the gen-
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eral assembly is held to have summoned the people to sit, 
by their delegates, in convention untrammeled by rules or 
restraints of any kind that will interfere with the perform-
ance of its proper functions. This is the prevailing view of 
the authority of such conventions and appears to be the log-
ical view. 
In the second instance, the legislature summons the con-
vention only after the people have expressed their will to this 
effect. If, at the time the question of calling the convention 
is submitted to them, the people are informed of the scope of 
the convention and the manner in which it is to conduct its 
deliberations, and report its results by virtue of the act of 
the general assembly specifying such matters, then a conven-
tion called in this manner will be limited as therein set forth 
and the convention will then be bound to confine itself within 
the stated limits of the act of the assembly. The reason for 
this is that it is the people, under such circumstances, who 
prescribe the conditions in the legislative act by approving 
the call for the convention in accordance with the provisions 
of such act. The legislature merely proposes the conditions. 
It is the vote of the people for the convention that ratifies 
them and makes them binding upon the delegates. 6 K. C. L. 
§ 18, p. 27. For this reason, in order that the delegates be 
so bound, it is necessary for the general assembly to propose 
the conditions before the election is held, and to take all nec-
essary steps to bring them to the attention of the people sea-
sonably before the time of voting at the election. This was 
done by the general assembly in 1853 when the people twice 
voted on such a call in this manner. "We therefore answer 
question (d) in the affirmative if the question is submitted 
to the people and the act of the general assembly prescribing 
rules for organization and conduct of the convention is 
brought to their notice before voting on the question; other-
wise our answer is in the negative. 
1 
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Question (e) must be answered not only in the light of 
legislative precedents in this state but also with due regard 
to our answer to question (d) . I t would seem that if the 
general assembly calls the convention, then the convention, 
itself, may disregard any legislative directions for ratifica-
tion of its work by the people and prescribe a method of its 
own. All the legislative precedents in this state, however, 
are in support of the view that the legislature can provide 
that the work of the convention shall be submitted to the peo-
ple for ratification or rejection before going into effect. 
Whether it is prescribed by the general assembly or the con-
vention. in either case we think a reference to the people for 
their approval or disapproval is a necessary and final step 
without which the work of the convention is lacking legality. 
I t seems to us that the better practice, and the one most 
likely to insure a final vote of the people on the convention's 
work would be for the general assembly to enact a law for 
this purpose. As the legislature under the existing govern-
ment has the power over the purse strings and exercises the 
legislative authority to define offenses and prescribe their 
punishment, neither of which powers is inherent in a consti-
tutional convention, it is clear to us that the legislature from 
a practical viewpoint is the only body that can order a refer-
endum election and make provision for the necessary appro-
priations therefor, and prescribe the punishment for offenses 
that may be committed thereat. Without this an orderly 
election would be difficult, if not impossible. The work of 
the conventions of 1824, 1841 and 1842 were submitted to 
the people in accordance with acts of the assembly. Follow-
ing those precedents and for the reasons above stated we 
answer the question in the affirmative. 
We now come to the final question ( f ) . If this question 
refers only to the matter of making a final count of the votes 
and officially reporting the result so that it may be duly reg-
istered and recorded as an authentic act of the people, we 
think for the reasons given in answer to question (e) that 
such act of the general assembly would be valid. If the 
question refers to the power of the general assembly to pro-
vide by law that the vote of a majority of the electors voting 
thereon shall be sufficient for ratification and adoption, our 
opinion, in view of the legislative precedents in this state, is 
that it has that power. Whether the exercise of it is subject 
to a power in the convention to require a larger majority is 
one which is not asked and which in the present state of the 
authorities we prefer not to answer. Of course if this ques-
tion of the necessary majority is submitted to the people, 
their decision is final. 
We have now given our opinions on all the questions which 
appear to have been clearly submitted to us or to be neces-
sarily implied, and so far all the judges of the court are in 
agreement. But there is a further question which is at 
least closely related to the provision covered by subparagraph 
(a) and may have been intended to be included therein. This 
question is: granting that the general assembly has the gen-
eral power to legislate with regard to the election by the 
people of a constitutional convention, as we have previously 
found, is that power subject to the condition that the people 
must consent at an election to the holding of such a conven-
tion? This has been discussed pro and con in briefs and 
arguments submitted to us and we therefore feel that we 
should express our opinion upon it. 
The exact question whether or not that general power is, 
necessarily and as a matter affecting the essence of the power, 
restricted by the condition stated, unless the constitution 
provides otherwise, has been very little discussed in the 
cases or by the text writers. Nearly all of them do not deny 
the existence of the general and unlimited power, and discuss 
whether the exercise of it is in conformity with general usage 
and with sound policy under ordinary circumstances. 
We have already seen that the majority of the court in 
Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, supra, stated that the leg-
islature did not have the power to call a convention without 
the consent of the people, and decided that it had no such 
power when the people within about three years had voted 
against the calling of a convention. Their treatment of the 
question covered by their statement is of the sketchiest. After 
proposing it and saying that the right of the people in the 
matter of changing the constitution is supreme, subject, how-
ever, to the condition that the legislature must approve, they 
say: "How may these—the people and the legislature—get 
together on this proposition? If no positive rule is provided 
by the fundamental law of the State, then, if a custom has 
prevailed for a sufficient length of years so that it is said to 
be fully established, that rule of custom must prevail. 
" I t seems to be an almost universal custom in all the states 
of the Union, where the constitution itself does not provide 
for the calling of a constitutional convention, to ascertain 
first the will of the people and procure from them a commis-
sion to call such a convention, before the legislature proceeds 
to do so. The people being the depository of the right to 
alter or reform its government, its will and wishes must be 
consulted before the legislature can proceed to call a conven-
tion. G R. C. L. §17, p. 27; Hoar, Constitutional Conven-
tions, p. 68, (1917). We find our own State, under the cus-
tom that has prevailed in other states, submitting to the 
people the question as to whether a convention should be 
called in the year 1915. (Acts 1913, ch. 304, p. 812.)" That 
is all they say on this point. 
The statement as to the custom in other states is much too 
sweeping and we do not see how the custom in other states, a 
very large part of which was af ter the adoption of the exist-
ing Indiana constitution can have the effect of a constitu-
tional provision in that state. I t appears elsewhere in the 
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opinion that the submission directed in 1913 was the only 
one in that state, at least since 1851; and neither of the cita-
tions supports in the slightest degree the vital sentence which 
the citations follow. On the other hand the dissenting judge 
in a long opinion on this one question beginning at page 541 
discusses the matter fully. On pages 549 and 550 he cites 
many authorities which state that the enactment of a law for 
the calling of a convention is within the power of a legisla-
ture, unless expressly forbidden, and do not suggest any 
other limitation of that power. 
At page 552 he says: "Reduced to its last analysis, it is 
clear that the only difference between the plan outlined by 
the court in its opinion and the plan embodied in the act of 
1917 is one of method. The plan recognized by the court may 
be more wise, more economical, and more expedient than that 
adopted by the legislature, and while such questions should 
be considered by the legislature before passing a law, they 
have no place here. When a court is engaged in considering 
the validity of a law from a constitutional standpoint it has 
no ears to hear arguments addressed to questions of wisdom, 
economy or expediency." At page 553 he cites twelve in-
stances in which conventions were called by legislative action 
alone without a reference to the people, four of them from 
Rhode Island, and concludes that as to the method to be 
adopted by a legislature "it is controlled only by the existing 
constitution, and, so long as it does not violate the express 
or implied provisions of that instrument, it may adopt the 
method which seems most wise and expedient under existing 
conditions." 
On pages 554 and 555 he ends as follows and with this, 
after most careful consideration, we fully agree: "One fur ther 
question remains to be considered. Does the plan of proced-
ure embodied in the act of 1917 conflict with § 1, Art. I, of 
the State Constitution, which reserves to the people the inde-
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feasible right to alter and reform their government? Under 
the plan adopted, the people have a right, through delegates 
elected for that purpose, to frame the constitution which 
would contain such alterations and reformations in the form 
of government as seemed proper to the delegates and after 
the constitution was so framed the people by their vote would 
have a right to accept or reject the changes thus offered. To 
my mind the plan adopted by the act does not in any way or 
to any extent impair or abridge the rights of the people under 
this section of the Bill of Rights; but, on the other hand it 
provides a means by which the people may exercise their 
indefeasible right to alter and reform their government. * * * 
I t may be and probably is true that, in view of the existing 
war conditions, this is an ill-chosen time to attempt constitu-
tional revision. I t may be t rue that the plan adopted by the 
legislature is unwise, in that it may occasion a useless ex-
penditure of the people's money, if it should be ascertained 
in the end that a new constitution is not desired, when that 
fact could have been learned in a manner much less expen-
sive. If the question to be decided involved the wisdom of 
the plan adopted or its expediency, my conclusion might be 
against it on those grounds, but, as such considerations can 
have no place in determining the validity of the plan from a 
constitutional standpoint, I am forced to the conclusion that 
the plan for holding a constitutional convention embodied in 
the act of 1917 is unobjectionable when viewed from that 
standpoint." We may properly add to this that the question 
of the advisability of spending the money of a state for any 
purpose is peculiarly one for the legislature to decide, except 
so fa r as it may be controlled by some clear provision in the 
constitution. 
I t is easy to understand how the majority of the court in 
this Indiana case felt toward the legislative act which called 
a convention so soon af ter the people by a very large majority 
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had refused to approve a call. But in our judgment they 
were wrong in allowing their natural indignation to lead 
them to lay down the rule of law which they did. 
The main ground which they gave for their statement was 
that "The people being the repository of the right to alter or 
reform its government, its will and wishes must be consulted 
before the legislature can proceed to call a convention." This 
seems to us clearly a non sequitur, as the people do all the 
altering and reforming of their government, if they first, 
through delegates chosen by them for that purpose, f rame 
and provisionally decide upon the changes to be made, if any, 
and then, at an election, finally decide to make them. I t is 
settled that the people alone cannot, without revolutionary 
action, call a constitutional convention, unless the constitu-
tion provides the necessary machinery for that purpose, but 
the legislature must take the first step in starting the pro-
cess of having the constitution re-examined, (which is the 
primary meaning of "revised"), by a convention chosen by 
the people, to see if in the sound judgment of the convention 
it ought to be altered and, if so, how. This is so because, 
unless the constitution furnishes the necessary machinery for 
electing the delegates and so forth, the legislature alone can 
provide it. 
If, after the legislature has decided that such a convention 
ought to be called for the purpose stated, it is essential to the 
legality of the call that the people vote in favor of it at an 
election, then that makes necessary four popular elections, 
before their power of alteration can be effective. That is, they 
must first elect a legislature that will pass the necessary leg-
islation ; second, they must vote in favor of a convention; 
third, they must elect delegates to a convention that af ter 
examining the constitution will frame and submit to the 
people the alteration desired; and finally at a fourth election 
the people must vote in favor of the alteration. The first, 
third and fourth of these elections are obviously necessary for 
legally altering the constitution by the convention method; 
and obviously again, the adoption by the people of the alter-
ation recommended by the convention ratifies all that has 
gone before, according to all the authorities on the subject. 
The requirement of the second election clearly impedes 
rather than facilitates the exercise by the people of their 
power to control their governmental institutions. 
I t may perhaps be wiser tha t i t be thus impeded, so as to 
make constitutional changes harder and slower to make, just 
as i t may be argued that it would be wiser to make a three-
fifths instead of a majority vote necessary for a legal altera-
tion of the constitution, or to require, for adoption of any 
change, majority votes in two elections two years apart . But 
each of these ways of impeding the people in the exercise of 
their fundamental power is a matter of policy and the adop-
tion of neither of them is necessary or even called for in 
order to make effective the exercise of that power. If the 
people deem it wise thus to impede the exercise of their own 
power, they may put a suitable provision into the constitu-
tion for that purpose. Or if the legislature deem it wise, it 
can decline to call a convention unless the people at an elec-
tion vote in favor of one. But in our judgment a court is 
going entirely outside of its proper functions to require that 
such an election be held, unless the constitution clearly re-
quires it. 
The opinion in State vs. Dahl, supra, is sometimes cited as 
supporting the view that a legislature cannot legally call a 
convention without obtaining the consent of the people, but 
a careful examination of the opinion shows that the rule 
there stated is one purely of policy and not of law. The ques-
tion at issue was whether the legislature had any power to 
submit the question to the people and the court holds that 
it had such power and says tha t in fact such submission is 
58 
desirable. At page 85, it says: "Nor can it be said that it is 
an empty form to leave to popular vote the grave question 
whether the people shall assemble in convention, and revise 
their fundamental law." 
We do not deny that this is a proper and may be a desir-
able method of procedure, but that is fa r from a statement 
that it is a legally necessary method. No such statement is 
made in the opinion, nor is one to be implied. In fact the 
court says at page 86, that "while the power resides in the 
legislature, and that body only, to call a constitutional con-
vention, it is obvious that it * * * should not * * * burden 
the people with the necessary expense of such a movement, 
without first submitting the question to them." This is 
clearly a dictum relating not to the power of the legislature, 
which is admitted, but only to what the court considers to 
be sound policy in exercising it. The expense is all that the 
court emphasizes, and as stated, supra, this is always a mat-
ter for a legislature to pass upon, except so far as restricted 
by the constitution. 
The court refers to and quotes from a message sent in 1820 
by the Council of Revision of New York to the legislature 
returning with its disapproval a bill which called a constitu-
tional convention without referring the matter to the people. 
The council stated its objections to be that it was "the most 
wise and safe course and most accordant with the perform-
ance of the great trust committed to the representative pow-
ers under the constitution" to submit to the people the ques-
tion of holding a convention. This is clearly a matter of 
policy and not of power. 
To be sure the message says that it "may well be doubted" 
whether it belongs to the ordinary legislature to call a con-
stitutional convention without first obtaining permission 
from the people. But it did not discuss or decide this ques-
tion of power and indeed it had no right to do so, as it was 
not a court, but only a special body vested with a veto power 
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over such legislation, and it proceeded on the ground of what 
it considered sound policy. 
We are aware of no other case which appears, even by way 
of dictum, to deny the power of the legislature, unless for-
bidden by the constitution, to call a convention without ob-
taining the consent of the people; nor have we found any text 
books on the general subject which deny that power, if not 
prohibited, though Hoar, at page 61, says that "there is 
some doubt as to whether the legislature can legally call a 
convention without obtaining the popular permission." There 
are many references to the general practice of submitting the 
matter to the people and to the fact that the great majority 
of state constitutions now require such a submission. But 
these considerations go to the point of policy and not to that 
of power and if there is any implication to be drawn from the 
latter of these facts, it is rather that the framers of these 
constitutions felt that it was necessary to require such sub-
mission in order to take away the power which the legisla-
ture would otherwise have to call a convention without ob-
taining the consent of the people. 
On the other hand a good many conventions have been 
held which were called by the legislatures without the con-
sent of the people and the results of whose work have been 
adopted by the people. We are not aware that the legitim-
acy of the constitutional changes thus made has ever been 
questioned. Jameson says at page 211: " I t must be laid 
down as among the established prerogatives of our General 
Assemblies, that, the Constitution being silent, whenever 
they deem it expedient, they may call Conventions to revise 
the fundamental law." Dodd says at page 46: "Then, too, 
when no provision is contained in a state constitution regard-
ing the calling of a convention, i t would seem to be within 
the discretion of the legislature as to whether the question 
should be submitted to the people." And as already quoted, 
60 
supra, the court in State vs. American Sugar Refining Co., 
137 La. 407, at 414, says that the silence of the organic law on 
the subject of conventions "leaves the question of calling such 
convention to the representatives of the people in legislative 
session convened." What the feeling or the general practice 
in this matter may have become since the adoption of a con-
stitution may very properly influence the discretion of the 
legislature in exercising its power under that constitution, 
but it seems to us utterly irrelevant as to the extent of the 
power, which must depend upon what the constitution meant 
when it was adopted. 
It is our conclusion, then, that outside of Rhode Island, in 
states in which a submission to the people of the question 
of calling a convention is not required by their constitutions, 
the legislatures have the power in their discretion to call 
conventions without such submission. 
The reasons which have led us to this conclusion apply in 
full force in this state. Moreover, there are facts peculiar 
to this state which to our minds make the same conclusion 
here clear and inevitable. 
In 1821 and again in 1822 the general assembly submitted 
to the electors, known as the "freemen", a request to express 
their "opinions" as to the "expediency" of calling a constitu-
tional convention, evidently as an aid to the general assembly 
in deciding the question of whether or not to issue such a call. 
In neither case were the freemen given any power to decide 
that question. In each case the freemen returned a large 
majority of opinions against the expediency of such a call, 
there being in the latter case 843 for and 1804 against. Yet 
in 1824, less than two years after this second unfavorable 
reply from the freemen, the general assembly, without again 
consulting them, issued a call for a constitutional convention 
by requesting the freemen to choose delegates to such a con-
vention, any constitution framed by the convention to be sub-
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mitted to the freemen for ratification. The freemen chose 
delegates accordingly and the convention was held. I t framed 
and submitted a constitution, which was rejected by the 
freemen. 
Again in 1834 the general assembly issued a similar call, 
without consulting the freemen, and a convention was chosen 
and held, but no constitution was framed. In 1841 and again 
in 1842 similar calls were similarly issued, conventions were 
chosen and held, the constitution framed by the former con-
vention being rejected and the one framed by the latter, our 
present constitution, being ratified. 
In all these proceedings the general assembly kept in itself 
and exercised the power to decide whether or not to call a 
convention and whether or not, before doing so, to obtain the 
opinions of the voters as to its "expediency". Then, too, all 
of these proceedings must have been well known to the fram-
ers of our present constitution and the later of them, at 
least, must have been well known to those who voted for its 
ratification. 
The next fact to be considered is that, as above stated, our 
constitution, as framed and ratified, provided and still pro-
vides, in section 10 of Article IV, that "The General Assem-
bly shall continue to exercise the powers they have hereto-
fore exercised, unless prohibited in this constitution." This 
does not say "the legislative powers" but "the powers", and 
according to the clearly correct reasoning of Chief Justice 
Ames in the unanimous opinion of this court in Taylor vs. 
Place, supra, as to the vesting of "the judicial power in the 
courts" by section 1 of Article X, "the powers" means all the 
powers. Section 10 of Article IV then clearly continued in 
the general assembly the power to call upon the people to 
elect a constitutional convention, whenever it deemed it ex-
pedient to do so, without submitting to the people the ques-
tion of such call, unless the exercise of this power was "pro-
hibited" by the constitution. 
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As we have previously said in this opinion, this power can-
not be held to be prohibited by anything short of an express 
prohibition or language which is equivalent to an express 
prohibition. We have stated supra that in our judgment Ar-
ticle XI I I is not such a prohibition. The only other provi-
sion in our constitution on which any argument against this 
broad power can conceivably be based is the language above 
quoted from section 1 of Article I that "the basis of our 
political systems is the right of the people to make and alter 
their constitutions of government", the "paramount obliga-
tion" of which "in all legislative, judicial, and executive pro-
ceedings" we freely admit. But as we have previously shown 
herein, we cannot see that the submission by a legislature to 
the people of the preliminary question of whether a conven-
tion should be held is any necessary part of the exercise by 
the people of their fundamental right to make and alter their 
constitutions. Indeed we cannot see that it is any part at all 
of the making or altering of a constitution by the conven-
tion method. That is done by the free choice by the people of 
delegates to a convention, under legislative sanction, the 
framing by the convention of a new constitution or of the 
alteration to be made of an existing one, and the ratification 
by the people of the proposed constitution or alteration. 
As above stated, it is clear to our minds that the requiring 
of any extra election by the people which is not a direct and 
necessary part of the making or altering of a constitution 
impedes rather than facilitates the exercise by the people of 
their fundamental right. Indeed so many elections might be 
required in a constitution for its alteration as to make any 
such alteration very difficult and to constitute a very serious 
impairment of the people's fundamental right, Moreover, 
those who do not assert the unrestricted power of a legisla-
ture to call a convention recognize that at any rate the call-
ing of a convention, which has not previously been approved 
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by the people, is ratified if the people adopt the result of the 
convention's work. This clearly shows that there is really no 
inconsistency between the calling of a convention without 
first obtaining the express consent of the people and the 
fundamental right of the people to make and alter their 
constitutions. 
I t should also be kept in mind that, although prior to our 
present constitution there may have been in this state no 
constitutional declaration of the fundamental right of the 
people to make and alter their governmental institutions, yet 
that right was everywhere recognized af ter the Declaration 
of Independence, even in the states whose constitutions did 
not contain any such declaration. I t was no doubt recog-
nized in this state, and yet apparently no one asserted that 
it was inconsistent with that right of the people for the 
general assembly to call a constitutional convention without 
obtaining the consent of the people. 
We cannot see that the fact that the general assembly in 
1853 submitted to the people the question of the holding of 
a convention is of any importance whatever. As the general 
assembly could perfectly well have the discretionary power 
to call a convention either with or without the consent of the 
people, the fact that it chose to ask the consent of the people 
at that time does not at all tend to prove that it could not 
have validly called a convention without such consent if it 
had chosen to do so. 
In view of all these considerations we cannot see that there 
is any such inconsistency between the fundamental right of 
the people to make and alter their constitutions, as set forth 
in our bill of rights, and the previously many times exer-
cised power of our general assembly to call a convention, 
without submitting the question to the people, as would 
justify us in saying that that power of the general assembly 
is prohibited by our bill of rights. There is certainly no ex-
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press prohibition and it is clear to us that there is nothing 
which is substantially equivalent to an express prohibition. 
It is an entirely different case from that before this court in 
Taylor vs. Place, supra, in which it was rightly held that, in 
view of other provisions in the constitution, the language of 
section 1 of Article X clearly meant that all the judicial 
power was vested in the courts and that this was equivalent 
to an express prohibition of the exercise of any of that power 
by the general assembly. 
Our opinion then is that the general assembly clearly has 
the power to pass a law calling a constitutional convention 
without obtaining the approval of the people for the calling 
of such convention, and that whether the exercise of that 
power at any particular time is advisable or proper is for the 
general assembly alone to decide, giving such weight as it 
may deem proper to the existing circumstances, to the usual 
but by no means universal custom of legislatures to ask such 
consent and to the fact that the great majority of constitu-
tions now require it. 
EDMUND W . F L Y N N 
W I L L I A M W . Moss 
ANTONIO A . CAPOTOSTO 
FRANCIS B . CONDON 
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Finding myself unable to agree in one respect with the 
views expressed in the opinion of the majority of the judges 
in response to the questions asked us, I deem it my duty to 
set out my position in connection therewith. 
I am in general accord with the conclusion reached by the 
majority of the judges, and for the reasons expressed in their 
opinion, that a constitutional convention can be called under 
the constitution by the general assembly to revise that instru-
ment. This is in answer to the first question asked which is 
marked (a) which reads as follows: 
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power if the 
General Assembly should provide by law, 
(a) for a convention to be called to revise or amend the 
constitution of the state." 
In one particular, however, I am unable to concur with 
the holding of the majority opinion, and that relates to the 
necessity of the submission to the people by the general as-
sembly of the question of the calling of a constitutional con-
vention before the general assembly actually proceeds to 
make the call. 
Granting that a constitutional convention to frame a new 
constitution or generally revise the existing instrument may 
properly be held under the present constitution, it seems 
well settled that the legislature is the proper organ or body 
to initiate proceedings to bring such a convention into ex-
istence. The authorities are not uniform in construing the 
nature of the power employed in this connection. I t would 
not seem to be the ordinary legislative power in its narrow-
er sense. But whatever its nature, whether inherently legis-
lative, or as being in the legislature as the agent of the sover-
eign people and the most suitable body to act as representing 
them, it is clear that the power exists in some form, and a 
discussion at length as to its scope would not be profitable. 
A serious question is raised, however, as to what is the 
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legitimate exercise of this power by the legislature in start-
ing proceedings looking toward the calling of a constitu-
tional convention. 
There are two views. One is that the legislature has the 
power to call a constitutional convention without first sub-
mitting to the sovereign people the question as to whether 
they wish such a convention to be held; the other is that the 
power of the legislature in the first instance is limited to 
ascertaining from the people their desires in connection with 
the holding of a constitutional convention. 
Very respectable authority is found supporting both posi-
tions. Those arguing for the first contention or the broad 
power claim that such power is inherent in the legislature, 
and that it is entirely a matter of policy or the exercise of a 
sound discretion as to whether the question should first be 
submitted to the people. Those taking the second position 
urge that the submission of the question to the people is a 
necessary prerequisite to the proper exercise of the power by 
the legislature. 
After giving this question careful consideration, I have 
come to the conclusion that the reasoning which supports the 
second of the above views, viz.: that requiring submission to 
the people by the legislature of the question of calling a con-
stitutional convention in order to get their approval before 
making the actual call, is the sounder, the more correct, and 
the more in accord with modern trends and developments in 
constitution making. 
On this general proposition, without considering at this 
time conditions peculiar to this state, reference may be had 
to a few citations of authority. As early as 1820, Chancellor 
Kent of New York, in writing a report for the Council of 
Revision of that state, to whom had been submitted an act 
passed by both houses of the New York Legislature in con-
nection with the calling of a constitutional convention, used 
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the following language: " I t is worthy, therefore, of great 
consideration, and may well be doubted, whether i t belongs 
to the ordinary legislature, chosen only to make laws in pur-
suance of the provisions of the existing Constitution, to call 
a Convention in the first instance, to revise, alter, and per-
haps remodel the whole fabric of the government, and before 
they have received a legitimate and ful l expression of the 
will of the people that such changes should be made." Jame-
son, Constitutional Conventions, 670. 
There is, in another portion of the report, language which 
possibly implies that the question of submission might be 
one of policy. I t is submitted, however, that the above quo-
tation indicates that the writer 's opinion was clearly against 
the exercise of the broad power by the legislature. 
In Hoar on Constitutional Conventions at page 68 the 
following statement is found: "Thus convention-calling is not 
a regular function of the legislature, and there is a growing 
tendency toward the view that the legislature has no power 
to call a convention without first obtaining permission from 
the people." 
Dodd in The Revision and Amendment of State Constitu-
tions at page 51 says: "The practice of obtaining the popular 
approval for the calling of a convention may be said to have 
become almost the settled rule. Thirty-two state constitu-
tions require such a popular expression of approval, and even 
where it has not been expressly required such a popular vote 
has been taken in a majority of cases in recent years." At 
page seventy-one he fur ther says: "According to what is now 
the more usual procedure in the adoption of constitutions, 
there are three popular votes connected with the mat ter : 
(1) The vote of the people authorizing a convention. (2) 
The election by the people of delegates to the convention. 
(3) The submission to the people for approval of the consti-
tution framed by the convention." 
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In the case of State vs. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81, the court at page 
85 used the following language: "Nor can it be said that it 
is an empty form to leave to popular vote the grave question 
whether the people shall assemble in convention, and revise 
their fundamental law." 
While the decision of the court in this case was finally 
based on narrower grounds, nevertheless it seems clear from 
the language used in the opinion that the court stands for the 
general principle of submission. 
In the case of Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, a com-
paratively recent authority, the following view is approved 
by the court at page 539: "I t seems to be an almost universal 
custom in all of the states of the Union, where the constitu-
tion itself does not provide for the calling of a constitutional 
convention, to ascertain first the will of the people and pro-
cure from them a commission to call such a convention, be-
fore the legislature proceeds to do so. The people being the 
repository of the right to alter or reform its government, its 
will and wishes must be consulted before the legislature can 
proceed to call a convention." In this case there was a dis-
senting opinion which is approved and discussed at length by 
the other members of this court. 
Finally, it is noticeable that in the various state constitu-
tions expressly permitting the calling of constitutional con-
ventions (the number of such constitutions being well over 
thirty) in all but a very few the provision is contained that 
the question be submitted to the people for their approval 
before the convention is called. This state of facts reveals 
clearly the present trend and development in constitutional 
law on this point. 
The question is next presented as to whether anything in 
our own constitution or our historical background prevents 
the application of the general principles above set out to the 
issue now before us. I t is probable that the language of sec-
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tion 10 of Article IV of our constitution, having in mind our 
constitutional history, presents the strongest argument for 
the holding that the legislature has the power to call a con-
stitutional convention without first submitting to the people 
the question of whether they wish one called. In this con-
nection the conclusion of the majority of the judges is based 
to some extent on said section 10 of Article IV. This section 
reads as follows: "The general assembly shall continue to 
exercise the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless 
prohibited in this constitution." 
After the Revolution and prior to the taking effect of the 
present constitution in 1843, the state was still under the 
Royal Charter granted in 1663, slightly modified. This 
charter could hardly be termed a constitution, but it repre-
sented the fundamental law of the state. Under it the gen-
eral assembly had extremely wide powers. In the early years 
of the nineteenth century tha t body made use of both meth-
ods of calling constitutional conventions. In 1821 and 1822 
questions were submitted to the people as to the expediency 
of calling a constitutional convention and both times the 
vote was in the negative. In 1824, 1834, 1841 and 1842, the 
general assembly proceeded to call conventions without first 
asking the approval of the people. I t is clear therefore that 
prior to 1843 the general assembly, whether rightly or 
wrongly, exercised the power of calling constitutional con-
ventions directly. 
Apparently, therefore, the next point for consideration is 
whether, in the legislative grant given the general assembly 
in section 10. Article IV, under the present constitution, this 
power was continued on to the general assembly, or whether 
its exercise is prohibited by any other part of the constitu-
tion. 
I t would seem that the only portion of the present consti-
tution which could act as a check, limitation or prohibition 
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on any powers granted under Article IV, section 10 in this 
connection would be Article I, section 1. This whole sec-
tion together with its preamble must be read and construed 
together. I t is set out fully in the majority opinion. I t con-
stitutes a part of the bill of rights in the constitution. By its 
terms the sovereign people expressly reserved to themselves, 
as a matter of fundamental law, when they voted to accept 
the present constitution, the right to make and alter their 
constitutions of government. In the preamble i t is declared 
that the "essential and unquestionable rights and principles 
hereinafter mentioned shall be established, maintained, and 
preserved, and shall be of paramount obligation in all legis-
lative * * * proceedings." 
I t is largely from this general reservation of power that 
we find the authority to hold a convention a t all under the 
constitution, the latter being otherwise silent on the matter 
of calling a convention. The language of section 1, Article I 
and its preamble should be broadly construed. The intent is 
clear to reserve in the sovereign people all powers in connec-
tion with altering and making their fundamental law, except 
what is granted to the legislature under Article X I I I relat-
ing to amendments. The language and intent of the reserva-
tion seems wide enough to require that the sovereign people 
be consulted and their favorable opinion obtained before the 
legislature proceeds to call a constitutional convention. The 
people should be entitled to a participation in all the inci-
dents and steps connected with the proceedings instituted 
to set up a constitutional convention, which are included in 
the full exercise of the right to make and alter their constitu-
tion of government. 
In my opinion it does not meet the entire requirements of 
section 1, Article I and its preamble, to say that the people 
may vote for delegates to a convention, and that such con-
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vention will be obliged to submit its work to the people for 
approval or disapproval. Under the express reservation of 
rights in section 1, Article I, they are entitled to be consulted 
in the beginning as to whether or not they desire a constitu-
tional convention called to alter or revise their constitution. 
I t seems reasonable to hold, therefore, that section 1, Article 
I and its preamble act as a prohibition to the exercise of any 
power by the general assembly under section 10, Article IV 
to call a constitutional convention directly without first as-
certaining the will of the people. 
Section 10, Article IV of the constitution has been dis-
cussed by this court several times. One of the first occasions 
was in the well known opinion by Ames, C. J . in Taylor vs. 
Place, 4 R. I. 324. There it was forcefully held that an af-
firmative grant in the constitution of the judicial power to 
the courts operated as a necessary prohibition on the exercise 
of any judicial power by the general assembly under said 
section 10, Article IV. This opinion of Taylor vs. Place, 
supra, was later referred to in the case of Higgins vs. Tax 
Assessors of Pawtucket, 27 R. I. 405, where the court said 
"and therefore the affirmative words of the constitution 
granting judicial power to the Supreme Court and such other 
courts as the General Assembly should establish were con-
strued as taking away such power from the General As-
sembly." 
On the issue now presented to us for consideration, while 
perhaps the line of demarcation is not so distinct, neverthe-
less the same general reasoning would apply. Here instead 
of an affirmative grant of the judicial power, as in section 1, 
Article X, we have in section 1, Article I, a very clear, posi-
tive, and express reservation in the sovereign people of the 
right to make and alter their constitutions of government, 
which right is to be of paramount obligation in all legisla-
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tive proceedings, and which right, as we have seen, may be 
exercised by means of a constitutional convention. 
If the former is held to be a necessary prohibition as ap-
plied to the exercise of any judicial power passing to the 
general assembly under section 10, Article IV, it is difficult to 
see why, in the present inquiry, the latter reasonably may not 
be construed as a prohibition to the use of any power by the 
general assembly in calling a convention without first ascer-
taining from the people if one is desired. 
In the case of the City of Providence vs. Moult on, 52 R. I. 
236, the court discusses at length the theory of local self-
government in its relation to the powers given the general 
assembly under section 10, Article IV. In holding that the 
general assembly has very broad powers, the following lan-
guage is used at page 243: "The above references show that 
under the charter the general assembly had unlimited power 
and authority restricted only by the constitution of the 
United States. Cities and towns had no powers of local 
self-government under the charter, and none were reserved 
to them by the constitution adopted in 1842." The cases of 
City of Newport vs. Horton, 22 R. I. 196 and Horton vs. City 
of Newport, 27 R. I. 283, are cited with approval. 
However, the situation presented in the Moulton and 
Horton cases, supra. and that now being considered seem 
plainly distinguishable. I t is clear that no powers were re-
served to the towns by the present constitution adopted in 
1842, whereas in section 1, Article I, there is an unequivocal 
reservation of right in the sovereign people to make and alter 
their constitutions of government. 
If historical precedents are of any value, we find that twice 
in 1853 the general assembly submitted to the people the 
question of whether a constitutional convention should be 
called. This action was ten years af ter the present consti-
tution went into effect and, while not conclusive, would seem 
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to have some value as an example of more or less contem-
poraneous construction. 
Under the present constitution, no general assembly as 
yet has ever issued a direct call for a constitutional conven-
tion. Possibly the decision of the judges in 1883 may have 
had a bearing on this state of facts, but nevertheless the 
usage and custom which developed have some force as a legis-
lative precedent. This court said in an Advisory Opinion of 
the Justices, 3 R. I. a t page 308 (1854), speaking of the exer-
cise of judicial power by the general assembly: "If the prac-
tice of the General Assembly, down to the adoption of the 
Constitution, had been to exercise such a jurisdiction, and 
such practice has been discontinued since, it is fair to pre-
sume it was discontinued because inconsistent with that in-
strument." 
I t is hard to perceive why the same argument on the exist-
ing facts cannot be made in connection with the exercise of 
the power to call constitutional conventions without first 
submitting the question to the people to find out their will. 
In view of the above considerations, it is my opinion that 
the right reserved to the sovereign people in section 1 of 
Article I of the constitution operates as a prohibition to the 
exercise by the general assembly of the power to call directly 
a constitutional convention under section 10 of Article IV of 
the constitution, and that there is, therefore, nothing in our 
existing constitution which prevents the application of what 
seems to be the sounder principle of the law relating to the 
calling of constitutional conventions by the legislature. 
I therefore answer the question marked (a) in the affirma-
tive, provided that the general assembly has, as a necessary 
prerequisite, first submitted to the people for their approval 
or disapproval the question of the calling of the convention. 
If the sovereign people approve, by a majority of those vot-
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ing, then the general assembly can proceed to make the call, 
otherwise not. 
If a question should be submitted to the people it would 
appears that its form is largely discretionary with the general 
assembly. The question might be merely the simple one as 
to whether a constitutional convention should be held; or it 
might be fuller and broader, setting out in some detail the 
type and scope of the convention proposed to be called. If 
the latter form of question is made use of, then the general 
assembly and the convention would be bound, in case of an 
affirmative vote by the people, to the type and scope of con-
vention referred to in the question. 
Assuming a convention called af ter a vote of approval by 
the people, then I concur in the answers given in the opinion 
of the majority of the judges, and for the reasons set out 
therein, to the subsidiary questions marked (b) , (c), (d) , 
(e), ( f ) . 
H U G H B . BAKER 
